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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council is the world’s
key intergovernmental body dealing with human rights. It was created
in 2006 to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights. 1 Its broad
mandate empowers it to address the human rights situation in any
State and on any human rights issue. 2 Since its creation, it has made
significant strides in the development, promotion and protection of
human rights. 3
Yet, on June 19, 2018, Ambassador Nikki Haley, the then-United
States (US) Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
1. See Economic and Social Council Res. 2006/2, ¶4 (Mar. 24, 2006); U.N.
Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶¶ 289–91, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004)
[hereinafter A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility]; U.N. Secretary-General, In
Larger Freedom: Development, Security and Human Rights for All, ¶¶ 181-83, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom: Development, Security and
Human Rights for All]; Nico Schrijver, The UN Human Rights Council: A New ‘Society of the
Committed’ or Just Old Wine in New Bottles?, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 809, 809 (2007).
2. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, HRC Briefing Note (Jan. 4, 2009),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session34/Docume
nts/HRCBasicFacts.pdf (outlining the powers accorded to the HRC including its ability
to “address any human rights issue brought to its attention”).
3. See Ted Piccone, Assessing the United Nations Human Rights Council, BROOKINGS
(May 25, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/assessing-the-unitednations-human-rights-council/ (“Since its establishment in 2006, the Human Rights
Council has carried out its mission . . . in a myriad of both traditional and innovative
ways. These include public scrutiny of every country’s human rights performance . . .
special sessions devoted to addressing gross and systematic violations . . . fact-finding
investigations; country visits by independent experts charged with monitoring issues
ranging from violence against women to freedom of expression; and technical
assistance and capacity-building.”).
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announced the US’ withdrawal from the Council. 4 Ambassador Haley
and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo listed the continued membership
of States “with unambiguous and abhorrent human rights records,”
the Council’s failure to scrutinize the world’s most inhumane regimes,
and its “chronic bias against Israel” as reasons for the withdrawal. 5
These criticisms are not new, and they are not without merit. 6 Indeed,
the same criticisms plagued the Council’s predecessor, the
Commission. 7
However, these criticisms also reveal the extent to which the
Council is misunderstood. Many reform suggestions—including
those advanced by the US—have focused on strengthening its
membership criteria. 8 We believe that such suggestions miss the
mark. They do not address fundamental structural reasons which
explain why the Council acts as it does. The Council is a political
body, so it is hardly surprising that its members act in a political way.
Whether one likes it or not, the Council reflects the globe that we live
in today, not the Western-dominated globe of the colonial yesteryear
or the world as Western liberal democracies might like it to be.
4. See Carol Morello, U.S. Withdraws from U.N. Human Rights Council over Perceived
Bias
Against
Israel,
WASH.
POST
(June
19,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expected-to-backaway-from-un-human-rights-council/2018/06/19/a49c2d0c-733c-11e8-b4b7308400242c2e_story.html.
5. Sec’y of State Mike Pompeo and Ambassador Nikki Haley, Remarks on the
U.N. Human Rights Council (June 19, 2018) (transcript available at
https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-the-un-human-rights-council/).
6. See Krishnadev Calamur, The UN Human Rights Council is a Deeply Flawed Body,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
20,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/us-un-humanrights/563276/ (highlighting the validity of many of the common criticisms of the U.N.
Human Rights Council and noting that these extend back to the Bush presidency).
7. See, e.g., Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: More of the
Same?, 31 WIS. INT’L L. J. 208, 209 (2013) [hereinafter Freedman, The United Nations
Human Rights Council: More of the Same?] (criticizing the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights for its “selectivity, bias, and partiality”); Eric Heinze, Even-handedness and the
Politics of Human Rights, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 7, 10 (2008) (“[A]n international body
formally charged with making neutral pronouncements on human rights, such as the
former U.N. Human Rights Commission, can be shown to have acted illegitimately
through political bias.”).
8. See generally Press Release, General Assembly, Solution to Reform of Security
Council ‘Is in Your Hands,’ General Assembly President Says as Member States Begin
Annual Debate on Long-Standing Issue, U.N. Press Release GA/11022 (Nov. 11, 2010)
(discussing membership criteria and the ongoing push for reform).
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In this article, we explain how and why the Council functions as it
does. Part One provides an outline of the Council, focusing on its
composition, mandate and activities. Part Two then places the Council
in its political context, including the pervasive nature of politicization
within the Council, its historical and ongoing North/South divide, and
reasons behind its bias against Israel. Part Three suggests a way forward.
Using the example of the Council’s treatment of sexual orientation and
gender identity (SOGI) rights as a case study, we argue that to fulfill the
potential of the Council and reassert its relevance, the majority of its
Members must take “ownership” of human rights rather than treat it as
a political football within broader North/South and other ideological
divides. Part Four concludes this article.

II. WHAT IS THE COUNCIL, AND WHAT DOES IT
DO?
Created in 2006, the UN Human Rights Council is the key global
intergovernmental human rights body. 9 Its importance within the UN
framework is demonstrated by its status as a body which reports
directly to the UN General Assembly. 10 It has a wide mandate to
promote, protect and develop human rights, which covers all states
and all human rights issues. 11 Nonetheless, it is often criticized for its
failure to properly address human rights breaches and protect
victims. 12 This section will outline the composition and mechanisms
of the Council, as a prelude to uncovering whether the criticisms are
well-placed.

9. See E.S.C. Res. 2006/2, supra note 1, ¶ 4; A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, supra note 1, ¶¶ 289–91; In Larger Freedom: Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, supra note 1, ¶¶ 181–83; Schrijver, supra note 1, at 809.
10. See G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 2006) (“Decides further that the Council shall
review its work and functioning five years after its establishment and report to the
General Assembly.” [emphasis original]). Its predecessor, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, was a subsidiary of the UN Economic and Social
Council, so it did not report directly to the UN General Assembly.
11. See G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶¶ 2, 5 ([T]he Council shall be responsible
for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all. . . .”).
12. See, e.g., Morello, supra note 4 (discussing the Trump Administration’s
opposition to the Council with statements from then-Ambassador Haley and Secretary
Pompeo).
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A. MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL
The Council is composed of 47 Member States. 13 In replacing the
Commission with the Council, the UN updated the memberships
allocated to the various regions according to the principle of
“equitable geographical distribution.” 14 The allocations within the
Commission had, for example, given too much weight to the Western
Europe and Other Group (WEOG) and too little to Asia. 15 The
allocations of seats at the Council are: Africa with 13 seats, Asia 13,
Eastern Europe 6, Latin America 8, and WEOG 7 seats. 16 This means
that Africa and Asia hold over half of the seats (26 in all) between
them, meaning “[i]n short, Afro-Asia can call the shots on the
Council.” 17 The redistribution of seats has seen power shift within the
Council to States which favor a less robust and confrontational
approach to human rights violations. Yet any other allotment would
be difficult to justify, given the reality of population distribution in
the world. Indeed, strict distribution according to population would
result in Asia having over half of the seats on its own. 18
Member States are elected by the UN General Assembly to serve for
three years and a maximum of two consecutive terms. 19 The latter
condition is a welcome innovation. There were no term limits on the
Commission. 20 China (though for a long time in the form of Taiwan) and
Russia (or USSR) sat constantly on the Commission, and the US only
13. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶ 7.
14. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶ 14.
15. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Establishes New
Human Rights Council by Vote of 170 in Favour to 4 Against, with 3 Abstentions, U.N.
Press Release GA/10449 (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter General Assembly Establishes
New Human Rights Council] (detailing the Council’s attempts to resolve the “longstanding problem of underrepresentation of Asian countries in the Human Rights
Commission”).
16. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶ 7.
17. BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, THE LAW, POLICY AND POLITICS OF THE UN
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 145 (2015).
18. See Asia Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV. (May 12, 2019),
http://worldpopulationreview.com/continents/asia-population/ (last visited June 15,
2019) (“Asia comprises a full 30% of the world’s land area with 60% of the world’s
current population.”).
19. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶ 7.
20. See General Assembly Establishes New Human Rights Council, supra note 15
(providing that term limits would give all of the Council’s “members the opportunity
to serve, and the Council would be more representative. In short, the Council would
have legitimacy in membership and decisions.”).
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missed one year. 21 It is desirable to have fluctuating membership and for
dominant voices to sometimes be absent. 22
Council members are elected by a majority of the UN General
Assembly in a secret ballot. 23 A region risks losing a seat if it presents
an unacceptable candidate with no alternatives. It was hoped that this
system would discourage “clean slates”, where the number of
candidates presented by a UN region corresponds with the number
of seats available to it in an election. 24 The system was meant to
encourage genuine choices and votes. 25 Initially, regions responded
by presenting open lists so the General Assembly accordingly rejected
notorious abusers such as Azerbaijan, Belarus and Sri Lanka in favor
of more deserving rival candidates. 26 Other major abusers have been
dissuaded from ultimately standing for election, such as Syria in
2011. 27 Most surprisingly, the superpower Russia was rejected in the
2016 elections for a term from 2017. 28 However, clean slates from all
21. Members (1947-2006), U.N. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP & BUREAU,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/Membership.aspx (last visited
June 15, 2019).
22. See Conall Mallory, Membership and the UN Human Rights Council, 2 CAN. J. HUM.
RTS. 1, 8–9 (2013).
23. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶ 7.
24. See Toby Lamarque, ‘Clean Slate’ Elections Threaten the Future of the Human Rights
Council, UNIVERSAL RTS. GRP. (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.universalrights.org/blog/clean-slate-elections-threaten-the-future-of-the-human-rightscouncil/ (“Elections should promote the participation of a diverse set of countries,
from different regions, with different backgrounds, all of which earn their seat by
demonstrating their commitment to human rights in a competitive election. Clean slates
have the opposite effect.”).
25. See Philip Alston, Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting
the New UN Human Rights Council, 7 MELB. J. INT’L L. 185, 198–99 (2006) [hereinafter
Alston, Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime]; see also Lamarque, supra note 24
(“General Assembly resolution 60/251 establishing the Council declares that all
members must be elected by secret ballot, taking into account the candidates’
“contribution . . . to the promotion and protection of human rights”. The clear
implication is that election to the Council should be competitive. In other words, there
should be a choice.”).
26. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012 368, 404, 40910 (2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2013.pdf (providing
context for the human rights abuses perpetuated by Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Sri Lanka).
27. See Patrick Worsnip, Kuwait Elected to U.N. Rights Panel Instead of Syria, REUTERS
(May
20,
2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rights-un-councilidUSTRE74J5IO20110520 (“Syria, under pressure over its crackdown on protesters,
dropped its bid for an Arab slot on the controversial panel.”).
28. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly, by Secret Ballot, Elects
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regions have returned as the norm. 29 So far, the General Assembly
has balked at the notion of depriving a region of a seat in electing
Council members.
The criteria for membership to the Council is “soft.” Candidate
states make voluntary pledges and commitments that they will
“uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of
human rights.” 30 States also commit when electing members of the
Council to “take into account the contribution of candidates to the
promotion and protection of human rights and their voluntary
pledges and commitments made thereto.” 31 However the criteria are
essentially unenforceable, as commitments may be mere posturing,
and votes take place with a secret ballot. 32 There is also evidence of
votes being traded, without consideration of human rights issues. 33
More rigorous membership criteria were proposed by various States
and other stakeholders at the time the Council was created, but were

14 Member States to Serve Three-year Terms on Human Rights Council, U.N. Press
Release GA/11848 (Oct. 28, 2006) (referring to the Russian Federation’s status as an
outgoing member); Julian Borger, Russia Denied Membership of U.N. Human Rights Council,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
28,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/28/russia-denied-membership-ofun-human-rights-council (“Russia has lost its bid to become a member of the UN’s
human rights council, in a defeat that reflects the diplomatic cost of its war in Syria”).
29. See Eleanor Openshaw et al., Vote Trading and Sliding Standards Risk Eroding the
Credibility of the Human Rights Council, INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. (May 10, 2016),
http://www.ishr.ch/news/vote-trading-and-sliding-standards-risk-eroding-credibilityhuman-rights-council (highlighting the fact that nations seeking election “often stand
unopposed” and stating that because “criteria exists, electing States should carefully
consider whether candidates are living up to it when casting their votes” rather than
simply voting for an unopposed candidate).
30. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶ 9.
31. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶ 8.
32. See Peter Splinter, Elections Without Choice: “Clean Slates” in the Human Rights
Council,
OPEN
GLOB.
RIGHTS
(Oct.
12,
2017),
https://www.openglobalrights.org/election-without-choice-clean%20slates-in-thehuman-rights-council/ (“[S]ecret ballot makes it nearly impossible to hold states to
account for how they vote in HRC elections. It hides from scrutiny evidence of the
widespread practice of vote trading whereby votes for election to the HRC are
exchanged for other UN electoral candidacies.”).
33. See, e.g., Sharri Markson, U.K. Deal to Back Saudi Arabia for U.N. Human Rights
Council
Exposed,
THE
AUSTRALIAN
(Sept.
29,
2015),
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/world/uk-deal-to-back-saudi-arabia-forun-human-rights-council-exposed/news-story/9e469a9f92cd9a3fe2c778068aedb73a
(providing an example of vote trading between the UK and Saudi Arabia).
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not adopted. 34 The topic of membership criteria is revisited in Part 2.
A State may be suspended from the Council by a vote of two thirds
majority of the General Assembly if it is found to have committed
“gross and systematic violations of human rights.” 35 Libya was
suspended from the Council in 2011 as a response to the crackdown
by its then government on protesters and later armed rebel groups
within the country. 36 Libya’s position on the Council was restored
after the overthrow of that government. 37 The risk of the ignominy
of suspension perhaps provides some disincentive against the gravest
abusers seeking membership.

B. THE COUNCIL’S MANDATE
The Council conducts regular and special sessions, at which it
passes resolutions which can relate to any aspect of human rights. 38
They can be passed with respect to a State or region or be a resolution
on a particular human rights issue. Most of the Council’s substantive
resolutions are passed by consensus and are characterized by broad
statements supporting relatively uncontentious aspects of human
rights. However, contentious issues do arise, particularly resolutions
condemning particular States. Resolutions are not legally binding, 39
34. See generally Alston, Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime, supra note 25, at 19394 (outlining the various suggested, but unimplemented, criteria).
35. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 10, ¶ 8.
36. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Suspends Libya from
Human Rights Council, U.N. Press Release GA/11050 (Mar. 1, 2011) (“[T]he United
Nations General Assembly suspended Libya’s membership in the Human Rights
Council, the Organization’s pre-eminent human rights body, expressing its deep
concern about the situation in that country in the wake of Muammar Al-Qadhafi’s
violent crackdown on anti-Government protestors”).
37. Member States Vote to Reinstate Libya as Member of U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N.
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/11/395392-memberstates-vote-reinstate-libya-member-un-human-rights-council
(“United
Nations
Member States voted overwhelmingly today to readmit Libya as a member of the UN
Human Rights Council, eight months after the North African country was suspended
for its then government’s violent repression of a popular protest movement”).
38. See generally PERMANENT MISSION OF SWITZ. TO THE U.N. OFF., THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COUNCIL: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 8-10 (2015) [THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL:
A
PRACTICAL
GUIDE],
https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/InternationaleOrg
anisationen/Uno/Human-rights-Council-practical-guide_en (providing background
information on the Council’s regular and special sessions).
39. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 38, at 5 (“The
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but they carry significant political and moral weight, particularly if
passed by consensus or a large majority. 40
Since its inception, the Council has adopted significant new human
rights standards and procedures. For example, it adopted new human
rights treaties to combat disappearances 41 and to promote and protect
the rights of people with a disability. 42 It adopted the Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, 43 after that instrument had
stalled for over a decade. 44 It has adopted important new standards
for human rights implementation, such as the ‘Guiding Principles on
business and human rights’. 45 Finally, individual complaints systems
have been created for core UN treaties where they previously did not
exist. 46
The Council’s powers of ‘enforcement’ lie in the process of naming
and/or shaming a State that is engaged in human rights abuses. 47 No
HRC . . . resolutions and decisions are not legally binding but do contain strong political
commitments”).
40. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 38, at 5, 18
(highlighting the importance of the HRC resolutions status as the non-binding “political
expression of the views of its members”).
41. G.A. Res. 61/177, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance (Dec. 20, 2006).
42. G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Dec.
13, 2006).
43. G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples 1-2 (Sept. 13, 2007).
44. See, e.g., Doug Cuthand, Bill on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Being Stalled, THE
TELEGRAM
(June
15,
2019),
https://www.thetelegram.com/opinion/columnists/doug-cuthand-bill-onindigenous-peoples-rights-being-stalled-322763/ (“The United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007
after two decades of negotiations and deliberations within the organization.”).
45. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, annex, 6 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights] (providing the foundation upon which the guiding principles
on business and human rights are grounded).
46. See generally Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2 (Dec. 10, 2008); G.A. Res. 66/138, annex, Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications
Procedure, art. 5 (Dec. 19, 2011).
47. Sarah Joseph & Joanna Kyriakakis, The United Nations and Human Rights, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1, 26 (Sarah Joseph
& Adam McBeth eds., 2010) (“None of the human rights institutions discussed above
are able to make legally binding decisions, unlike, for example, the regional human
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government relishes being the subject of such shaming processes, and
even the most powerful States will lobby to avoid such
consequences. 48 Beyond embarrassment, shaming is sometimes the
first step towards the adoption of stronger—either unilateral or
multilateral—measures against a State. 49 It can galvanize local civil
society organizations and lend credibility to domestic opposition
groups. 50 It can prompt further pressure from other States, public
protests, the media, and non-government organizations (NGOs). 51
Other States can find themselves the target of secondary pressure to
‘do something’ about the shamed State, placing strain on a relevant
alliance, and even on diplomatic relations. 52 Corporations might be
pressured to withdraw investments from a delinquent State, or to not
invest in the first place. 53 While shaming may not, in many
circumstances, lead to immediate changes in behavior by target States,
it can have a long-term corrosive effect on a delinquent government,
playing a role in a government’s change in behavior or ultimate
demise. 54
rights courts. Their powers of ‘enforcement’ lie in the process of naming and shaming
a State that is engaged in human rights abuses”).
48. Id. at 26 (“No government enjoys being the subject of such shaming processes,
and even the most powerful States will lobby to avoid such consequences.”).
49. Id. at 28 (noting that “[w]hile shaming is the most common form of
international enforcement of human rights, the most serious human rights situations
can prompt stronger unilateral and multilateral sanctions.”).
50. Id. at 27 (“Beyond embarrassment, shaming can have real consequences for a
government. The shaming of a government can galvanise and lend credibility to
domestic opposition groups.”).
51. Id. at 27 (describing how “[s]haming can prompt further pressure from other
States, public protests, the media, and NGOs.”).
52. Id. at 27 (“In extreme cases, allies of a shamed government can find themselves
the target of secondary pressure to ‘do something’ about the shamed State, placing
extreme strain on the relevant alliance.”).
53. Id. at 27 (“Certain non-State actors, such as corporations that invest in a
delinquent State, might be pressured to remove their investments, or to not invest in
the first place.”). See generally James H. Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Politics of Shame: The
Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the U.N.C.H.R., 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 861,
868-69 (2006) (highlighting how States’ loss of reputation can have significant market
effects).
54. See DARREN G. HAWKINS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN CHILE 74-75 (2002) (explaining how the public shaming of
the Chilean government under Pinochet was in part the reason for its later fall); Joseph
& Kyriakakis, supra note 47, at 27 (“While shaming may not, in many circumstances,
lead to immediate changes in behaviour by target States, it can have a long-term
corrosive effect on a delinquent government, playing a role in a government’s change
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The work of the Council can be divided into five main areas:
regular sessions, special sessions, Special Procedures, the Universal
Periodic Review, and a complaints system. We will deal with these in
turn.
1. Regular Sessions
Regular sessions take place in Geneva three times a year, in March,
June and September, for a total of ten weeks. 55 The regular agenda is
dictated by Council Resolution 5/1, its “Institution-Building
Resolution,” 56 and consists of the following ten items:
1.

Organizational and procedural matters

2.

Annual report of the United Nations

3.

Promotion and protection of all human rights

4.

Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention

5.

Human rights bodies and mechanisms

6.

Universal Periodic Review

7. Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab
territories
8.

Follow-up and implementation of the Vienna Declaration (1993)

9. Racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related forms of
intolerance, follow-up and implementation of the Durban Declaration.
10. Technical assistance.

The agenda is ultimately very broad, enabling the Council to discuss
any State and any human rights situation in the world. The placement of
topics under particular agenda items frames the manner in which those
topics are dealt with. 57 Hence, it can be manipulated by Members to
in behaviour or ultimate demise.”).
55. See Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, annex, U.N. Doc. A/62/53, at 65 (June
18, 2007).
56. H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 55, at 61.
57. See generally Ellis Heasley, Moving On Up: The UN Human Rights Council Agenda

86

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[35:1

confine debate within artificially narrow limits. For example, discussions
of country-specific situations can be watered down by taking place under
Item 10, which emphasizes a cooperative and facultative role for the
Council in its dealing with a State, rather than under Item 4, which entails
a more robust discussion of a State’s flaws. 58
Item 7 specifies the only country situation which occupies part of the
regular agenda, the situation in the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan
Heights. While the human rights situation in that area is serious, it is
anomalous that any particular situation is designated as part of the
Council’s regular discussions. 59 Item 7 is one example of the Council’s
apparent bias against Israel, one of the major causes of dissatisfaction
with the institution (and its predecessor) and the US withdrawal. 60 We
return to this issue below.
2. Special Sessions
A special session of the Council may be called by one-third of its
membership, enabling it to respond quickly to human rights

Items Explained, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN FULL: A BLOG BY CSW (Oct.
24, 2018), https://forbinfull.org/2018/10/24/moving-on-up-the-un-human-rightscouncil-agenda-items-explained/ (describing how items listed under agenda item 4 are
typically understood to be more pressing than those listed under agenda item 10).
58. Human Rights Council: Stalled Momentum on Country Responses Partly Offset by Thematic
Advances,
HUM.
RTS.
MONITOR
Q.
1,
4
(2011),
https://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/hrm/files/hrmq_nov11_final.pdf
(noting
that “Item 10 . . . focuses on provision to the State of technical cooperation and
capacity building . . . [and that] Item 4 [provides a forum where] the Council can discuss
situations of concern from a wider perspective than just provision of technical
assistance.”).
59. See Colum Lynch, U.S. Thwarted in Bid to Change U.N. Rights Council’s Approach to
Israel,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(May
30,
2018,
4:08
PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/30/u-s-thwarted-in-bid-to-change-u-n-rightscouncils-approach-to-israel/ (pointing out that “[n]o other part of the world has its own
agenda item.”); see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Holds
General Debate on the Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab
Territories
–
Press
Release
(July
2,
2018),
https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-holds-general-debateon-the-human-rights-situation-in-palestine-and-other-occupied-arab-territories-pressrelease-2/ (highlighting the severity of the human rights abuses going on in the
countries referenced by Item 7).
60. Colum Lynch, U.S. Thwarted in Bid to Change U.N. Rights Council’s Approach to
Israel, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 30, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/30/u-sthwarted-in-bid-to-change-u-n-rights-councils-approach-to-israel/.
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emergencies during the times in which it is not sitting, 61 or to simply
devote particular attention to a serious human rights crisis. By the end
of 2018, the Council had held 28 special sessions on:
1.

Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2006)

2.

Israeli military action in Lebanon (2006)

3.

Israeli military action in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2006)

4.

Human rights in Darfur (2006)

5.

Human rights in Myanmar (2007)

6.

Israeli military action in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2008)

7.

World food crisis (2008)

8.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (2008)

9.

Israeli military action in Gaza (2009)

10. Global economic and financial crisis (2009)
11. Human rights in Sri Lanka (2009)
12. Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and East Jerusalem (2009)
13. Human rights and recovery in Haiti (2010)
14. Human rights in Côte d’Ivoire (2010)
15. Human rights in Libya (2011)
16. Human rights in Syria (2011)
17. Human rights in Syria (2011)
18. Human rights in Syria (2011)
19. Human rights in Syria (2012)

61. G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 16 (Mar. 15, 2006).
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20. Human rights in the Central African Republic (2014)
21. Human Rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem (2014)
22. Human Rights situation in Iraq in light of abuses committed by the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups (2014)
23. Terrorist attacks and human rights abuse and violations committed by
the terrorist group Boko Haram (2015)
24. Preventing further deterioration of the human rights situation in
Burundi (2015)
25. The deteriorating situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab
Republic, and the recent situation in Aleppo (2016)
26. Human rights situation in South Sudan (2016)
27. Rohingya and other minorities in Rakhine State in Myanmar (2017)
28. The deteriorating situation of human rights in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem (2018)

Two country situations dominate this list. Understandably, given the
vicious civil war in Syria which has killed hundreds of thousands since
2011, 62 there have been five special sessions devoted to that State. 63 The
other situation dominating such proceedings is Israel and the Occupied
Territories, which has been the subject of eight special sessions. 64 Three
of those sessions concerned significant armed conflicts, notably Israel’s
incursions into Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in late 2008 and 2014, which
justified special attention. 65 However, the need for an extra five special
sessions, especially when there is a relevant regular agenda item, is
doubtful. This is another alleged manifestation of the anti-Israel bias,
62. Megan Specia, How Syria’s Death Toll is Lost in the Fog of War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-deathtoll.html.
63. U.N.
Hum.
Rts.
Council,
Special
Sessions,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Pages/SpecialSession
s.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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which we discuss below.
Also notable are the crisis situations not listed above, such as the
ongoing war in Yemen, 66 massacres in Egypt, 67 the civilian casualties
in the war against Islamic State in Mosul in Iraq, 68 and the violent
crime in Mexico that has killed tens of thousands over the last
decade. 69 As explained below, the Council is commonly criticized for
selectivity, which is manifested both by disproportionately targeting
certain States and situations, and by neglecting certain severe abuses,
such as those just mentioned.
3. Special Procedures
The Council has built on the Commission’s system of special
procedures, consisting of special experts (known as “special rapporteurs”
or “independent experts”) and working groups, which was developed
over the last forty years. 70 Special procedures can be created to examine
a particular human rights issue or the human rights situation in a
particular State.
At the end of 2018, there were 44 thematic and eleven country
mandates. 71 The thematic mandates variously focus on particular civil
and political rights (e.g. freedom from torture, freedom of
expression), economic social and cultural rights (e.g. right to culture,
right to food), particular categories of rights-holders (e.g. migrants,
indigenous peoples), the environment (right to a healthy
environment, disposal of toxic waste), particular causes of human
66. Yemen Crisis: Why is There War?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.
67. Egypt: Five Years Since ‘Rabaa Massacre’, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/egypt-years-rabaa-massacre180813145929087.html?xif=.
68. Samuel Oakwood, Counting the Dead in Mosul, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/counting-the-dead-inmosul/556466/.
69. Kate Linthicum, More and More People are Being Murdered in Mexico - and Once More
Drug
Cartels
are
to
Blame,
L.A.
TIMES
(Mar.
3,
2017),
https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-murders-20170301story.html.
70. Aoife Nolan et al., The United Nations Special Procedures System, BRILL (Aoife
Nolan et al. eds., 2017).
71. U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts, Special Procedures of the Human
Rights Council, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx
(last visited on Sept. 20, 2019).
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rights abuse (e.g. transnational corporations, mercenaries), or on
North/South economic justice issues (creation of an equitable
international order, human rights and foreign debt, extreme poverty
and international solidarity). 72 Most of these mandates have carried
over from the Commission, though the Council has created over a
quarter itself. 73 Some of the mandates could possibly be merged to
save resources. For example, the toxic waste mandate could now
perhaps be incorporated within the broader (newer) mandate on a
clean environment. However, it is politically difficult to drop thematic
mandates which might correspond with the pet issues of specific
States. 74
The country-related mandates are more controversial. Naturally,
no State likes being singled out for a special procedure. Some
influential States, such as China, Cuba and Egypt, are historically
opposed to country mandates as a matter of principle. 75 Indeed, there
was some concern that the Council, upon its establishment, might
abolish such mandates altogether. 76 This did not happen, but it did
look for a while as if the country mandate system might simply erode
away. 77 No new mandates were created in the Council’s first five
years, 78 while mandates on Liberia, Belarus, Cuba, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo were discontinued, 79 and the
Sudan mandate hung by a thread, renewed for diminishing periods of
time. 80 However, the Council changed course in 2011 when a new
mandate for the Islamic Republic of Iran was created, followed by new
mandates for Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Mali and the return of a special
procedure for Belarus. 81
At the end of 2018, there were eleven mandates to investigate the
72. Id.
73. Marc Limon & Hilary Power, History of the United Nations Special Procedure
Mechanism: Origins, Evolution and Reform, UNIVERSAL RTS. GRP. 10 (Sept. 2014),
https://www.universal-rights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/URG_HUNSP_28.01.2015_spread.pdf.
74. See Alston, Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime, supra note 25, at 216.
75. Id. at 205-06.
76. See Limon & Power, supra note 73, at 10.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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following States: Belarus, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Eritrea,
North Korea, Iran, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, and the situation of
human rights in the Palestinian Territories. 82 Unlike thematic
mandates, which are generally renewed for three years, 83 country
mandates are usually renewed only for one year, 84 so the Council has
more opportunities to reconsider and possibly terminate them.
However, the Palestinian mandate was established in 1993 to last until
the end of the Israeli occupation, so it is never subjected to a vote
over its renewal. 85 Another distinguishing feature of this mandate is
its one-sidedness; it only concerns human rights in the Occupied
Territories rather than Israel itself, and only the behavior of Israel
rather than that of the Palestinian authorities or Hamas. 86 Hence, the
special opprobrium which the Council reserves for Israel is reflected
in the special procedures too.
The reports arising from the Special Procedures themselves are an
invaluable source of factual, legal and normative material. Thematic
special procedures produce reports on specific themes under their
mandate, as well as reports summarizing their findings from visits to
particular States. 87 These reports play a pivotal role in elaborating and
advancing human rights standards, including, in recent times, on such
valuable topics as the right to life and the use of force by private security
providers, 88 freedom of expression and the internet, 89 as well as in the

82. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, President’s statement, Situation of human rights in
Haiti, U.N. A/HRC/PRST/34/1 (Apr. 3, 2017).
83. U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Working with the United Nations
Human Rights Programme: A Handbook for Civil Society, HR/PUB/06/10/Rev.1, 107
(2008) [Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme],
https://www.ohchr.org/en/AboutUs/CivilSociety/Documents/Handbook_en.pdf.
84. Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme, supra note 83, at 107.
85. Country-Specific Special Procedures, INT’L JUST. RES. CTR., https://ijrcenter.org/unspecial-procedures/list-of-country-specific-special-procedures/ (last visited June 30,
2019).
86. H.R.C. Res. 1993/2, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/RES/1993/2, ¶ 4(a) (Feb. 19, 1993).
87. See Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme, supra note 83, at 107.
88. Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions), Rep. on the right to life and the use of force by private security providers in law
enforcement contexts, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/39 (May 6, 2016).
89. Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the promotion and protection of the right
to freedom of opinion and expression, U.N. Doc. A/66/290 (Aug. 10, 2011).
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digital age, 90 the right of everyone to mental health, 91 the protection of
whistle-blowers, 92 and the impact of gender on enjoyment of the right to
food. 93 It is however difficult to identify concrete reforms generated by
Special Rapporteurs at the country level. States will rarely admit that they
have “seen the light” after a fact-finding visit from a mandate holder. 94
Nevertheless, the compilation and issuance of mandate holders’reports
may contribute significantly to human rights dialogue with and within a
State.
Mandate holders serve in their independent expert capacity rather
than as government representatives. 95 The relationship between the
Council and the mandate holders themselves has at times been
fractious. 96 While some States extend standing invitations to all
thematic special procedures, others refuse to allow mandate holders
to conduct fact-finding activities in their territories. 97
In 2007, the Council adopted the Code of Conduct for Special
Procedures Mandate-Holders of the Human Rights Council. 98 Many
of the principles therein are arguably unobjectionable, but it
represents an effort by some States to constrain the mandate-holder’s
discretion in choosing how to do their job and to elevate the value of
State information over those of non-state actors. 99 The Code also
gives the impression that the conduct of mandate-holders is of greater
90. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 (May 11, 2016).
91. Special Rapporteur, Rep. on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/21 (Mar. 28, 2017).
92. David Kaye, (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, U.N. Doc. A/70/361 (Sept. 8, 2015).
93. Special Rapporteur, Rep. on the right to food, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/51 (Dec. 14,
2015).
94. Poverty Causing ‘Misery’ in U.K., and Ministers are in Denial, Says U.N. Official, BBC
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-46236642.
95. Marc Limon & Ted Piccone, Human Rights Special Procedures: Determinants of
Influence, UNIVERSAL RTS. GRP. 2 (Mar. 2014).
96. Limon & Piccone, supra note 95, at 2.
97. Heather Collister, Human Rights Council: Persistent Non-Cooperation from some States,
INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. (June 20, 2014), https://www.ishr.ch/news/human-rightscouncil-persistent-non-cooperation-some-states.
98. H.R.C. Res. 5/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/5/2 (June 18, 2007).
99. U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Manual of Operations of the
Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, 21–22 (Aug. 2008),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/CoordinationCommittee/Pages/Manual
ofspecialprocedures.aspx.
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pressing concern within the human rights field than the conduct of
abusers. 100
The Code of Conduct is now wielded by States when they are unhappy
with criticism from a Special Rapporteur. For example, Kenya launched
an attack on the credibility of the then-Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, in the
wake of his 2009 report. 101 Kenya accused Alston of breaching the Code
by relying on “incredible” information. 102 It added: “His demeanour and
hostility during his interactions with Government officials attests to the
fact that his impartiality and objectivity were compromised.” 103 At one
point, it seemed possible that the Africa group and other members of the
Council might withdraw support from Alston, effectively forcing his
resignation. 104 That circumstance did not eventuate. 105
Alongside the special procedures, the Council also authorizes the
creation of “Commissions of Inquiry” or “Fact-finding Missions,”
composed of independent human rights experts who investigate the
most serious human rights abuses, including breaches of international
humanitarian law, and make findings of fact and law. 106 For example, the
Council has authorized Commissions on Inquiry for Syria, Libya, North
Korea, and more recently, Myanmar in the wake of genocidal violence
against the Rohingya minority. Commissions on Inquiry differ from
other mandates in that they are essentially investigative bodies, and they
tend to report on only the most extreme human rights abuses, such as
those which constitute international crimes like genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity. They can cover entire States or they can
100. Collister, supra note 97.
101. Gakuu Mathenge, How Kenya Turned Africa Against Alston, STANDARD DIG.
(June 20, 2009), https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/1144017390/how-kenyaturned-africa-against-alston.
102. Government of the Republic of Kenya, Response to the Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary or Summary Executions, Professor Philip Alston, on his
mission to Kenya from 16-25 February 2009, (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Response to the Report
of the Special Rapporteur].
103. Response to the Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 102.
104. Bernard Namunane & Alphonce Shiundu, Kenyan Government plots to oust UN
rapporteur Alston, HUM. RTS. HOUSE (June 8, 2009).
105. Namunane & Shiundu, supra note 104.
106. See generally International Commissions on Inquiry on Human Rights, FactFinding
Missions
and
other
Investigations,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/COIs.aspx (last visited Sept. 17,
2019).
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focus on specific atrocities. They are designed to uncover the truth with
regard to gross human rights abuses, with a view to their findings perhaps
prompting and being used in international criminal proceedings.
Commissions on Inquiry are not the sole preserve of the Council: other
UN bodies have also established such inquiries, such as the Security
Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General. 107
4. Universal Periodic Review
Universal periodic review (UPR) is the major innovation in the
Council’s work compared to the Commission. 108 UPR entails the review
of the human rights record of each UN Member State. It takes place
under the auspices of the Council but all States can take part in a review.
In a State’s UPR, its human rights record is assessed against the Charter
of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
the human rights instruments to which the reviewed State is a party,
its voluntary pledges and commitments, and applicable international
humanitarian law. 109 The review involves consideration of
information prepared by the State concerned, a compilation of
relevant official UN materials (e.g. comments by treaty bodies and
Special Rapporteurs on the relevant State), and a summary of other
“credible and reliable information provided by other relevant
stakeholders.” 110 This latter document allows for the input of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), national human rights
institutions, and human rights academics.
UPR is a welcome development as every State’s human rights record
is reviewed, regardless of its size or political power. States parties to the
various UN treaties have long been reviewed periodically by the UN
treaty bodies. However, such reviews are not comprehensive because
they only concern States parties to, as well as the rights in, the relevant
107. See U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Commissions on Inquiry and
Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law:
Guidance
and
Practice
(2015)
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf;
Ted Piccone, UN Human Rights Commissions of Inquiry: the Quest for Accountability,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 2017).
108. U.N.
Hum.
Rts.
Council,
Universal
Periodic
Review,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/uprmain.aspx (last visited Sept. 17,
2019).
109. H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 55.
110. H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 55.
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treaty. In contrast, UPR provides a hitherto unavailable opportunity for
the review, for example, of China’s record regarding civil and political
rights, and the US’s record on economic social and cultural rights. 111
UPR is far from perfect. Each State’s report is limited to 10,700
words, 112 while the review dialogue itself takes place in half a day.
Many interventions are political, with States praising their allies and
excoriating their enemies. 113 Some interventions contradict human
rights law or are so vague as to be useless. The quality of UPR
contrasts poorly with the depoliticized longer reviews undertaken of
States reports by the UN treaty bodies. The reviewed State is also able
to reject recommendations, no matter how sound they might be.
Having said that, there is no doubt that States care what their peer
States think and say about their human rights record, so UPR entails
a significant measure of international human rights accountability.
There have been some moves by States to undermine the process.
Worryingly, Russia successfully lobbied in 2013 for two
recommendations (both made by Georgia) to be removed from
official documentation on the grounds that they did “not comply with
the basis of the review stipulated in [HRC] resolutions 5/1 and
16/21.” 114 In that same year, Israel boycotted its own UPR, in protest
against the Council’s bias against it. 115 In its most recent UPR in 2018,
Israel attended its review but refused to participate in the subsequent
111. Universal
Periodic
Review,
HUM. RTS. WATCH
(May
2000),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/un/un0506/3.htm. China is not a party
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171), while the US is not a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3).
112. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, 3rd Cycle Periodic Review National Report –
Guidance
Note,
https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/generaldocument/pdf/ohchr_guidance_national_report_3rdcycle_en.pdf (last visited Sept.
17, 2019).
113. Juliette De Rivero, Curing the Selectivity Syndrome: The 2011 Review of The Human
Rights
Council,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(June
24,
2010),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/06/24/curing-selectivity-syndrome/2011-reviewhuman-rights-council; Zach Zarnow, Universal Periodic Review: Problems and Potential
Human
Rights
Brief,
HUM.
RTS.
BRIEF
(Apr.
6,
2010),
http://hrbrief.org/2010/04/universal-periodic-review-problems-and-potential/.
114. Roland Chauville & Mirza Taqi, Unprecedented Challenge to the Universal Periodic
Review,
INT’L
SERV.
HUM.
RTS.
(May
31,
2013),
https://www.ishr.ch/news/unprecedented-challenge-universal-periodic-review.
115. Israel Boycotts U.N. Human Rights Council, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 29, 2013),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/01/2013129163929359758.html.
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adoption of its UPR report. 116 Israel’s no-shows set a worrying precedent
which may undermine the universality and legitimacy of the UPR
process.
Nevertheless, the process has improved significantly since it began
in 2008. States increasingly focus their statements on useful
comments and recommendations rather than on time-wasting
diplomatic niceties. 117 Any State can participate in any review, so
reviews cannot be artificially dominated by allies or enemies.
Procedural compliance, in terms of the timely delivery of reports and
attendance at reviews, has been very high. While States can and do
reject recommendations, many recommendations are accepted,
though the entire process would benefit from greater accountability
being imposed on States to implement accepted recommendations
between reviews. The UPR process also stimulates important national
dialogues within the States being reviewed.
5. Complaints Procedures
The Commission had two complaints mechanisms. The “1503”
procedure was a confidential complaints procedure whereby the
Commission could receive communications regarding situations that
‘reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of
human rights’ in any country or region in the world. It also adopted a
public procedure, the “1235” procedure. In certain situations,
consideration of 1503 complaints were transferred to the public 1235
procedure, which was obviously more embarrassing for the State. 118
Numerous Commission special procedures were germinated by 1503
complaints.
The Council has retained and marginally improved the complaint
mechanisms. Complaints still concern allegations of consistent
patterns of gross and evidenced human rights violations and may be
made against any State regardless of the treaties it has ratified.
116. Israel Boycotts UN Adoption of its Own Human Rights Report, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/israel-boycotts-un-adoption-itsown-human-rights-report.
117. Subhas Gujadhur & Marc Limon, Towards the Third Cycle of the UPR: Stick or
Twist?, UNIVERSAL RTS. GRP. 26 (July 2016), https://www.universal-rights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/URG_UPR_stick_or_twist.pdf.
118. Marc Limon, Reform of the UN Human Rights Petitions System, UNIVERSAL RTS.
GRP. 17 (Jan. 2018).
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Individuals, groups, and NGOs can submit complaints. Complaints
remain confidential unless elevated to a public investigation. For
example, the Council’s confidential considerations of human rights in
Eritrea ceased at its 21st session in 2012 and were transmitted to a
new Special Rapporteur, whose mandate had been created in the
previous session. 119 A positive innovation is that the authors of
complaints are now better informed of the progress of their complaint.
Consideration of a complaint is also generally faster than was the case
with the Commission.

C. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The Advisory Committee to the Human Rights Council is a body
made up of eighteen independent human rights experts from around the
world. It provides research and advice on human rights matters as
requested by the Council. In that respect, it is a less powerful body than
its predecessor, the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, which advised
the Commission. The Sub- Commission was able to perform work in
human rights areas without a specific request from the Council, which
enabled it to set its own agenda and, to a limited extent, that of the
Commission. For example, the Sub-Commission’s work on business and
human rights, disability, and disappearances prompted actions in those
areas by the Commission, which carried through to the Council. Absent
a power of initiative, those issues may never have made it into the
Commission/Council’s program.
Therefore, the Committee is unfortunately a step backwards from
the Sub-Commission. As experts acting without political motives, the
Advisory Committee is better placed than the Council to identify gaps
in human rights law and spearhead developments beyond the more
narrow limits created by the dynamics of member State interests. 120

D. THE ROLE OF NGOS
NGOs play an important role in the Council even though they cannot
per se gain membership. 121 According to Joachim Rücker, former
119. H.R.C. Res. 21/1, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/21/1 (Sept. 26, 2012).
120. Sarah Joseph & Joanna Kyriakakis, The United Nations and Human Rights, RES.
HANDBOOK INT’L HUM. RTS. L. 15, 26 (Sarah Joseph & Adam McBeth eds., 2010).
121. G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 16 (Mar. 15, 2006); Anne Herzberg, Submission regarding
Human Rights Council Resolution 32/31 on Civil Society Space, NGO MONITOR (July 9,
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President of the Human Rights Council:
NGOs put issues on the agenda, provide vital information about human rights
on the ground, and give a voice and face to human rights. NGOs assist to
implement and monitor the implementation of the decisions and resolutions
of the Council at the national level. NGOs are thereby often bridging the gap
between the international, regional and national levels, by helping to translate
our work into action, by triggering change, and by reminding us to strive for
accountability. 122

Approximately 350 NGOs participate in Council proceedings 123 by
delivering written and oral statements, and holding and participating in
panel discussions, informal meetings and parallel side events. 124 In order
to participate at the Council, an NGO must be accredited as an observer,
generally by applying to the UN Committee of NGOs for consultative
status. 125 The process of accreditation is beset by a number of serious
issues, not least its politicization. 126 Within the Council, some States
interrupt or silence NGOs by abusing points of procedure. For example,
a State might continually object and interject during oral statements on
the basis that an NGO’s comments are outside the remit of a particular
agenda item.
Despite these considerable barriers, NGOs play an influential role
at the Council. According to Schokman and Lynch, ‘the evidence is
2017).
122. Joachim Rücker, Importance and Impact of NGOs at the Human Rights Council, INT’L
SERV. HUM. RTS. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.ishr.ch/news/importance-and-impactngos-human-rights-council.
123. For an illuminating study of NGOs at the Council, see Fiona McGaughey, From
gatekeepers to GONGOs: A taxonomy of Non-Governmental Organisations engaging with United
Nations human rights mechanisms, 36 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 111, 111-32 (Apr. 16, 2018).
124. Eric Tistounet, Ten Years On: From a Short Play with Intermissions to Opera Without
Pause, INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. (June 4, 2016), https://www.ishr.ch/news/ten-yearsshort-play-intermissions-opera-without- pause.
125. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, ¶¶ 29, 41-44 (July 25, 1996).
126. See, e.g., The Backlash Against Civil Society Access and Participation at the United
Nations, INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. 2, 4-5 (May 30, 2018), https://www.ishr.ch/news/newreport-backlash-against-civil- society-access-and-participation-united-nations (last
visited July 22, 2019) (noting examples where individual countries black listed NGOs
for “ties to terrorism” with offering any evidence); NGO Committee: Politics Front and
Centre as Human Rights NGOs Get Deferred Again, INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. (2018),
https://www.ishr.ch/news/ngo-committee-politics-front-and-centre-human-rightsngos-get-deferred-again (“Only 7% of deferred applications from human rights
organisations were recommended for accreditation, compared to 23% of development
NGOs.”).
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clear: effective NGO engagement enhances the relevance, efficiency
and impact of UN human rights mechanisms and contributes
constructively to states’ understanding and implementation of their
international human rights obligations.’ 127 Skilled and determined
advocacy efforts by NGOs can make a key difference between
success and failure in prompting Council action on a matter, as seen
for example in the case study on SOGI rights at the Council discussed
below. In a promising sign, the participation of NGOs continues to
increase, in particular NGOs from the developing world. 128

III. WHY DOES THE COUNCIL FUNCTION SUBOPTIMALLY?
As is clear from the above overview of the Council, it is not
functioning as effectively as it could. It is beset by politicization, which
affects the quality and credibility of its output, and stymies the efforts of
mandate-holders and civil society to uphold human rights standards.
In this Part, we examine the reasons why this is so.

A. MEMBERSHIP
Membership of the Commission by States with terrible human rights
records—and a desire to undermine the effectiveness of the Commission
itself—was a key factor in that institution’s downfall. When the Council
was being established, there were hotly contested debates over
membership criteria. While the stronger proposals were rejected, 129 a
number of ‘soft’ measures designed to protect the integrity of the
Council’s membership were adopted as explained above. There is some
evidence that these modest proposals have served to keep some of the
worst abusers off the Council. 130
127. Ben Schokman & Phil Lynch, Effective NGO engagement with the Universal Periodic
Review, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: RITUALS AND
RITUALISM 126-46 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2015).
128. See Laura K. Landolt & Byungwon Woo, NGOs Invite Attention: From the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council, 16 J. HUM. RTS. 407, 40910, 415, 417-18 (2017) (summarizing a recent study indicating a sharp increase in NGO
participation and its important effects on the HRC).
129. See, e.g., Alston, Reconceiving the U.N. Human Rights Regime, supra note 25, at 193
(“In 2004, the US suggested that the Commission should avoid becoming ‘a protected
sanctuary for human rights violators who aim to pervert and distort its work’ by
insisting that only ‘real democracies’ should enjoy the privilege of membership.”).
130. Mallory, supra note 22, at 3.

100

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[35:1

However, serious human rights abusers continue to gain seats on
the Council, so reform of the membership continues to be a common
theme amongst proposals for change. For example, US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo stated the following in his statement on the US
withdrawal from the Council:
Its membership includes authoritarian governments with unambiguous and
abhorrent human rights records, such as China, Cuba, and Venezuela.
There is no fair or competitive election process, and countries have
colluded with one another to undermine the current method of selecting
members. 131

The then-US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, stated:
One of our central goals was to prevent the world’s worst human rights
abusers from gaining Human Rights Council membership. What
happened? In the past year, the Democratic Republic of Congo was
elected as a member. The DRC is widely known to have one of the worst
human rights records in the world. Even as it was being elected to
membership in the Human Rights Council, mass graves continued to be
discovered in the Congo.
Another of our goals was to stop the council from protecting the world’s
worst human rights abusers. What happened? The council would not even
have a meeting on the human rights conditions in Venezuela. Why? Because
Venezuela is a member of the Human Rights Council, as is Cuba, as is
China. 132

Haley here reflects the constant critique of the Council as “dictatorfriendly” and “pro-rogue regimes.” 133 Yet a number of comments may
131. Michael Pompeo & Nikki Haley, Remarks on the U.N. Human Rights Council,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 19, 2018).
132. Pompeo & Haley, supra note 131.
133. See, e.g., Rosa Freedman, How Rights Violators Keep the U.N. Human Rights Council
Focused on Israel, THE CONVERSATION (July 7, 2015, 10:25 AM),
http://theconversation.com/how-rights-violators-keep-the-un-human-rights-councilfocused-on-israel-44319 (“Israel is an occupying power – as are China, Turkey, and
Morocco, among others, all of whom ought to be scrutinised.”); Jon Sharman, U.K. Puts
U.N. Human Rights Council ‘On Notice’ Over ‘Anti-Israel Bias’, THE INDEPENDENT (Mar.
25, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uk-un-humanrights- council-on-notice-israel-bias-palestinian-settlement-a7649171.html (noting
human rights concerns in China, Egypt, & Saudi Arabia); Brett D. Schaefer, U.S.
Withdrawal From the U.N. Human Rights Council is the Right Decision, THE HERITAGE
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be made in response. First, it cannot be right that Venezuela was kept
off the Council’s agenda due to the presence of itself, and China and
Cuba, on the Council. They are only three votes: other Members
therefore helped drive that decision. Secondly, Haley does not mention
any of the many States on the Council in with relatively “good” human
rights records such as Australia, Chile or Japan. Finally, she names no
State that is a close US ally, hence Saudi Arabia and Iraq are not
mentioned, despite objectively appalling human rights records.
The obsession with the identity of those elected to the Council
leads us to a key question: how bad, in fact, is the Council’s
membership? Is it disproportionately populated by authoritarian and
human rights abusing regimes?
The relative human rights performance of Council members will vary,
as one third of its members are elected each year. It is difficult to rate,
rank or measure a Member’s human rights performance in the absence
of globally endorsed criteria. Reputable sources, such as the Concluding
Observations of UN treaty bodies, are not written in such a way as to
easily compare countries so as to facilitate a ranking of States.
Nevertheless, we have resorted to one such index, simply to convey
some sort of picture of the human rights records of Council members,
and therefore of the Council as a whole. The Freedom in the World
index, compiled annually by the NGO Freedom House, rates States as
“free,” “partly free,” or “not free,” according to certain political rights
and civil liberties criteria. 134 An analysis of the 2018 Council membership
reveals that 69% are rated “free” or “partly free,” with 44% rated
FOUND. (June 21, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/uswithdrawal-the-un-human-rights-council-the-right-decision (emphasizing the HRC’s
inability to condemn human right violations in influential countries like China, Cuba,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, & Zimbabwe despite heavy bias against Israel); Gabriel Sassoon,
Ban Tyrants From Sitting On U.N. Rights Body, FORBES: CAPITAL FLOWS (July 24, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/07/24/ban-tyrants-from-sitting-onun-rights-body/ (arguing the HRC’s agenda is driven by human rights abusers who
frequently escape condemnation); David May, How to Fix the U.N.’s Anti-Israel Club of
Dictators,
THE
HILL
(Mar.
31,
2018),
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/381061-how-to-fix-the-uns-anti-israelclub-of-dictators (recognizing that Israel was the target of censure in five separate
resolutions, while North Korea, Iran, and Syria have only received four).
134. Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019, FREEDOM HOUSE (2019),
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracyin-retreat.
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“free.” 135 29% are rated “not free.” The 2019 membership follows a
similar pattern: 50% of member states are ranked “free,” 21% “partly
free,” and 29% “not free.” A brief look at previous years reveals that, in
any given year, “free” States outweigh “not free” States.
The Freedom of the World index has significant limitations, such
as its emphasis on civil and political rights to the exclusion of
economic and social rights. However, our brief analysis of its rankings
refutes the contention that the Council is overpopulated with grave
human rights abusers. In fact, the proportion of “free,” “partly free,”
and “not free” States mirrors the global preponderance of each
category. 136
Despite its problems, the Council is a body which represents the world
of today. The causes of its dysfunction are more complex than the mere
presence of States with terrible human rights records. Uncooperative
behavior within the Council comes from states with and without ‘good’
human rights records. While some reform of the membership criteria
could be welcome, we argue that the battle for universal human rights
observance will not be won by adopting an “us and them” mentality,
which a priori excludes significant numbers of countries in the world from
“the human rights club.” Such a solution is more likely to lead to
balkanized human rights discussions, and possible competing
intergovernmental institutions inside the UN. We believe that the
Council must remain a forum where non like-minded States, and civil
society, can talk to each other and occasionally cross divides to make
important human rights decisions. 137

135. See Iceland Replaces U.S. at U.N. Human Rights Council, ICELAND MONITOR: POL.
&
SOC’Y
(July
13,
2018),
https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/politics_and_society/2018/07/13/iceland_repla
ces_us_at_un_human_rights_council/ (recognizing that Iceland has replaced the US
on the Council – as both are ranked “free” they have been counted as one member for
the purposes of this analysis).
136. See Michael J. Abramowitz, Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis,
FREEDOM
HOUSE
2
(2018),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01042018_FINAL_PressRelease_FIW
2018.pdf (concluding 45% of qualifying countries are “free,” 30% are “partly free” and
25% are “not free”).
137. See Schrijver, supra note 1, at 822 (characterizing the non-participation of the
US under the Bush administration in the early days of the HRC as a “serious handicap”).
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B. POLITICIZATION, SELECTIVITY, AND DOUBLE STANDARDS
A key criticism of the Council is its “selectivity,” whereby “one
internationally responsible actor is singled out for condemnation,
whilst others escape censure for similar abuses.” 138 Selectivity is
normally intertwined with politicization, that is, the introduction of
unrelated controversial issues into the Council by States in order to
further their political interests. 139 As an intergovernmental body, the
Council can be expected to be political. However, extreme
politicization and selectivity undermine the Council’s credibility and
effectiveness. 140
These issues are not new. In 2005, then-Secretary General Kofi
Annan observed in relation to the Council’s predecessor:
The Commission’s ability to perform its tasks has been . . . undermined by
the politicization of its sessions and the selectivity of its work. We have
reached a point at which the Commission’s declining credibility has cast a
shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole. 141

Despite widespread hope that the Council would avoid the
Commission’s mistakes, many States and commentators have expressed
dismay at the Council’s politicization. States routinely direct excessive
scrutiny at some countries, altogether ignore other abusers, and shield
yet others from action. 142 While States from all regions and persuasions
engage in politicized behavior, those who are members of the NonAligned Movement and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
have been most frequently criticized for adopting these tactics. 143
138. Heinze, supra note 7, at 7.
139. See Gene M. Lyons et al., The “Politicization” Issue in the U.N. Specialized Agencies,
32 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 81, 89-90 (1977) (analyzing the concept of “politicization”).
140. Rosa Freedman & Ruth Houghton, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Politicisation
of the Human Rights Council, 17 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 753, 754 (2017).
141. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Address to the Commission on
Human
Rights
(Apr.
7,
2005),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2005-04-07/secretary-generalsaddress-commission-human-rights.
142. See, e.g., ROSA FREEDMAN, THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL:
A CRITIQUE AND EARLY ASSESSMENT 173-88 (2013).
143. See Yaniv Roznai & Ido Tzang, The United Nations Human Rights Council and Israel:
Sour Old Wine in a New Bottle, 5 HUM. RTS. GLOB. L. REV. 25, 51-52 (2013) (arguing the
decrease in representation of Western countries combined with the increase in
representation of African and Asian countries has resulted in the OIC becoming more
influential, and utilizing that influence to set the agenda).
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These tactics are adopted for a range of reasons. At a pragmatic
level, by focusing the Council’s limited time and resources
disproportionately onto a particular State, other States escape
scrutiny. Defending an ally can also provide “insurance” in case the
defender (the State deploying the argument) should one day itself
come under fire over human rights. 144 More prosaically, politicization
has likely become part of the embedded institutional culture of the
Council. 145
For developing States, politicization may also serve an important role
in their negotiations with more powerful States. Lyons et al. contend that
politicization can function as a form of protest. In the constant struggle
to place issues of concern for the Global South on the global agenda,
protest can be a way for Southern states to amplify their voices. Seen
from this perspective, “politicization” could be viewed as an attempt by
frustrated and relatively powerless nations to increase their bargaining
power. 146
Politicization of the Council is not the preserve of non-Western
countries. The Council has barely noted serious human rights violations
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, partly because Western States
shield themselves and their allies from scrutiny. 147 As discussed below,
while the US has rightly pointed to bias against Israel within the Council,
it has continued to offer reflexive support to its ally despite Israel’s
perpetration of serious human rights abuses.
Western States have also, at times, refused to engage cooperatively
with special procedures mandate holders. 148 For example, in response
144. See FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 139.
145. See MEGHAN ABRAHAM, A NEW CHAPTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: A
HANDBOOK ON ISSUES OF TRANSITION FROM THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 15 (Eléonore Dziurzynski ed., 2006) (“The powers
and functions of the Council are only a part of the reform process, the largest
determinant of which will be the willingness of States to change their own culture of
functioning and to empower the Council to act in accordance with its mandate.”).
146. Lyons et al., supra note 139, at 87 (we note that many, though not all, developing
States have grown in power since Lyons et al. wrote).
147. See Philippe Dam, Ten Lessons from 30 Sessions: Improving the Human Rights Council,
INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. (May 26, 2016), http://www.ishr.ch/news/ten-lessons-30sessions-improving-human-rights-council (“Western States’ paralysis has hampered
efforts to address important human rights crises, including on Bahrain, Azerbaijan,
Egypt and in response to the crimes committed by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.”).
148. See Rosa Freedman & François Crépeau, Supporting or Resisting? The Relationship
between Global North States and Special Procedures, in U.N. SPECIAL PROCEDURES SYSTEM
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to the 2015 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, thenAustralian Prime Minister Tony Abbott declared that Australians
were “sick of being lectured to by the United Nations.” 149 Canada
rejected the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on
Indigenous Rights in 2015. 150 In 2016, the United Kingdom rejected
criticism regarding arbitrary detention, and was openly critical of the
Special Rapporteurs on Adequate Housing and Violence Against
Women. 151
These objections are typical of an assumption by WEOG States of
superior human rights records as if they should be above scrutiny.
For example, in responding to the 2018 report of the Special
Rapporteur on extreme poverty which scrutinized the US,
Ambassador Haley suggested that “the special rapporteur wasted the
UN’s time and resources, deflecting attention from the world’s worst
human rights abusers and focusing instead on the wealthiest and
411, 412, 417-18 (Aoife Nolan et al. eds., 2017) (emphasizing that the broader the
mandate, the less likely western states are to support it).
149. Lisa Cox, Tony Abbott: Australians “Sick of Being Lectured To” by United Nations,
After Report Finds Anti-Torture Breach, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 9, 2015,
3:14 AM), https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/tony-abbott-australians-sick-ofbeing-lectured-to-by-united-nations-after-report-finds antitorture breach-2015030913z3j0.html.
150. Mike Blanchfield, Canada Rejects U.N. Call for Review of Violence Against Aboriginal
Women,
THE
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Sept.
19,
2013),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-to-reject-un-panels-callfor- review-of-violence-on-aboriginal-women/article14406434/; James Anaya (Special
Rapporteur), Rep. on the rights of indigenous people, The situation of indigenous peoples in Canada,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.2 (July 4, 2014); U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for
Hum. Rts., Canada must address root causes of extreme violence and discrimination
against
indigenous
women
–
Rights
experts
(Feb.
1,
2016),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17004
&LangID=E.
151. U.N.A.-U.K. Concerned by Dismissive Comments About U.N. Human Rights
Mechanism, U.N.A.–U.K. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.una.org.uk/news/una-ukconcerned-dimissive-comments-about-un-human-rights-mechanism;
Amelia
Gentleman & Patrick Butler, Ministers Savage U.N. Report Calling for Abolition of U.K.’s
Bedroom
Tax,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
3,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/feb/03/ministers-savage-un-reportabolition-bedroom-tax; Laura Bates, Rashida Manjoo is Right about British Sexism – Even If
it
is
Worse
Elsewhere,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
17,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/womens-blog/2014/apr/17/rashidamanjoo-british-sexism-female-suffering.
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freest country in the world.” 152 It bears emphasizing that the Special
Rapporteur found comparably high rate of poverty in the US, and
indications that extreme poverty is increasing. His conclusions were
based on sound evidence and data. 153
In conclusion on this point, all States engage in politicized and
selective behavior on the Council, though some are worse in this respect
than others. Decisions are often made and votes influenced by a State’s
political interests rather than its interests in promoting global human
rights.

C. BLOC BEHAVIOR
Each State on the Council is elected as a member of a particular
geographic bloc. These blocs influence (to varying degrees) how their
members behave and vote. Aside from the official UN groupings, other
blocs and alliances crisscross the UN regions, such as the Group of 77,
the Non Aligned Movement, the Like Minded Group, and the European
Union.
States often vote in blocs, make repeat statements and statements of
allegiance, as well as make wholly irrelevant statements in order to
protect bloc allies or attack bloc enemies. 154 Abebe contended in 2009
that the African Group had “deftly manipulated” the “sub-culture” of
factionalism and group alliance at the Council to create the Council it
wants—one in which independent oversight (from civil society and
independent experts) is limited, and country-specific condemnation is
eschewed in favor of a cooperative and consensual approach. 155
152. Ed Pilkington, Nikki Haley Attacks Damning U.N. Report on U.S. Poverty Under
Trump,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
21,
2018,
4:39
PM)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/21/nikki-haley-un-poverty-reportmisleading-politically-motivated.
153. See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on extreme poverty and human
rights on his mission to the United States of America, ¶¶ 1-3, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/38/33/Add.1 (May 4, 2018) (noting the Special Rapporteur received more
than 40 detailed written submissions in advance of his visit and met with government
officials at all levels, in addition to residents, people living in poverty, and academics).
In 2019, the UK was similarly displeased with the same Special Rapporteur’s scathing
report on extreme poverty in that country.
154. See FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 201 (discussing repetitive statements made
by members of the African Group and the OIC).
155. Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the
Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,
3 (2009).
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Furthermore, many developing States lack significant political and
economic clout, so they have few levers to pull to protect themselves
from current or future criticism beyond bloc solidarity and a track
record of support for state sovereignty. Idriss Jazaïry suggests that a
failure to work together as a bloc would “spell disaster for weaker
countries.” 156
The OIC contains members which straddle the two most numerous
UN blocs, Asia and Africa. Hence, it can push for resolutions which have
a good chance of gaining the support of a significant percentage of the
Council. 157 The OIC has not been shy in wielding arguably
disproportionate influence. In contrast, the European Union has not
been so savvy in pushing for initiatives that it would like to see
adopted. In part, this is because it can spend a long time coming to a
common position, now a requirement under EU treaties. 158
The existence and behavior of blocs may be a key source of the
Council’s dysfunction. However, the influence of blocs is less
straightforward than is commonly thought. Hug and Lukács have found
that voting which appears to be bloc driven can be interest driven. 159 The
influence of bloc pressures—as opposed to the alignment of interests
and convictions—can be hard to untangle.

D. THE SOVEREIGNTY DIVIDE
Since the Second World War, international human rights law has made
156. See generally Idriss Jazaïry, The Role of Regional Groups and Coordinators: A Case Study
– The African Group, in THE FIRST 365 DAYS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
COUNCIL 129 (Lars Müller ed., 2007) (we add that Mr Jazaïry undoubtedly possesses
insight into the matter, as he is the current Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive
measures and was formerly the Algerian Permanent Representative to the United
Nations in Geneva).
157. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 126.
158. See, e.g., Richard Gowan & Franziska Brantner, The E.U. and Human Rights at the
U.N.: 2011 Review, EURO. COUNCIL FOREIGN RELATIONS 1-2 (Sept. 2011),
https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR39_UN_UPDATE_2011_MEMO_AW.pdf
(observing that the EU’s “voting coincidence score” – a measure of its overall support
from other states for EU positions in human rights votes in the General Assembly –
has stayed level at 44%, more than 10% behind both China’s & Russia’s scores);
FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 205 (highlighting the EU’s “internal difficulties in
adopting a common position and the inability of members to deviate from that position
within the Council or to negotiate and compromise with other groups or blocs.”).
159. Simon Hug & Richard Lukács, Preferences or Blocs? Voting in the United Nations
Human Rights Council, 9 REV. INT’L ORG. 83, 84 (2014).
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significant incursions into the traditional zones of State sovereignty. In
particular, human rights abuses are no longer a State’s “own business.”
It is legitimate for international organizations with human rights
mandates, or individual States, to raise human rights concerns and to
strongly criticize a State’s human rights record.
Nonetheless, many States, particularly developing States, rely on
arguments based on of sovereignty to push back against country-specific
action by the Council. 160 A wide range of developing States—including
most of the African Group, and middle powers such as India—resist
country-specific special sessions as a matter of course. 161 For example,
India abstained on resolutions relating to the appalling situation in
Syria on the basis that “constructive dialogue is more productive than
‘finger-pointing and intrusive monitoring.’” 162 Fisher argues that by
prioritizing sovereignty in this way, States are “rewarding noncooperation, and clearly breaching the Council’s mandate to address
gross and systematic violations.” 163
Where scrutiny is unavoidable, many developing States prefer that it
occurs under the Council’s agenda item 10 (technical assistance and
capacity-building) rather than agenda item 4 (human rights situations that
require the Council’s attention). Not only does agenda item 10 avoid
‘naming and shaming’ the offending states, it also leaves the relevant
government in control of the process and implies that the government is
committed to improving its rights record, irrespective of evidence to the
contrary.
Numerous reasons account for this phenomenon. Many
developing States have serious human rights problems, so
deployment of the state sovereignty argument is a strategy to ward
160. See Jean-Philippe Thérien & Philippe Joly, “All Human Rights for All”: The United
Nations and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 373, 395 (2014).
161. See Eduard Jordaan, Rising Powers and Human Rights: The India-Brazil-South Africa
Dialogue Forum at the UN Human Rights Council, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 463, 465–66 (2015). See,
e.g., Arvind Narrain, India’s Role in the Human Rights Council: Is There a Constitutional Vision
in its Foreign Policy?, 57 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 87, 98-99 (2017) (emphasizing that India tends
to abdicate any leadership role on human rights even in the case of egregious violations,
such as the conflict in Syria).
162. See Jordaan, supra note 161, at 471.
163. John Fisher, Potential Unfulfilled: Strengthening the Council’s Approach to Country
Situations,
INT’L
SERV.
HUM.
RTS.
(May
30,
2016),
https://www.ishr.ch/news/potential-unfulfilled-strengthening-councils- approachcountry-situations.
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off unpleasant criticism. Furthermore, as noted above, weaker States
(which make up the majority of the UN and the Council) may want
the insurance of a known commitment to state sovereignty in case
they should find themselves in the firing line in the future.
Many developing States are former colonies that are very protective
of their relatively recent independence. They are or feel more
vulnerable to a possible loss or weakening of their sovereignty than
longer established States. Stanton argues that “it is well-known that
the practice of intervention has diverged from international law with
respect to ‘less civilized,’ ‘non-Western,’ ‘developing’ states, leaving
intervention linked with imperialism and colonialism in historical
memory.” 164 More pragmatically, many former colonies continue to
face significant challenges to their sovereignty, either from separatist
minority groups or from breakdowns in peace, security and public
order. 165
More generally, some commentators from the developing world see
the power dynamics of colonialism replicated in the UN, and the Council
specifically. Adebajo has described African States’ positions in the UN –
one in which in which they wield little influence, while receiving
considerable criticism – as ‘global apartheid.’ He suggests that:
[T]he paradox of the [UN] is that while it embodies ideals of justice and
equality, the power politics embedded in its structures . . . often mean that
the powerful Brahmins of international society (the ‘Great Powers’) can
manipulate the system to the disadvantage of the wretched ‘untouchables’). 166

In reviewing the UN at the end of last century, Ali Mazrui declared
that:
[T]he UN deserves two cheers for trying to contribute to the racial, gender,
ecological, and equity revolutions of the twentieth century . . . But the United
Nations gets no cheers at all for acting as an instrument of
164. Kimberly Stanton, Pitfalls of Intervention: Sovereignty as a Foundation for Human
Rights, 16 HARV. INT’L REV. 14, 16 (1993).
165. See generally Francis M. Deng, The Evolution of the Idea of ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’,
in GLOBAL APARTHEID TO GLOBAL VILLAGE: AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 191
(Adekeye Adebajo ed., 2009) (discussing the implications for sovereignty of these
conditions).
166. Adekeye Adebajo, Ending Global Apartheid: Africa and the United Nations, in
GLOBAL APARTHEID TO GLOBAL VILLAGE: AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 3
(Adekeye Adebajo ed., 2009).
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counterrevolution in the furtherance of Western cultural hegemony. Better
luck in the twenty-first century. 167

Of course, political intervention by the West did not cease with the
end of colonialism, with covert US intervention across much of the world
since the 1950s and recent overt interventions by Western powers in Iraq,
Kosovo, Libya and Mali. The US regularly deploys unmanned drones to
kill suspected terrorists in other States. Political intervention is not
limited to the West—for example note Saudi Arabia’s intervention in
Yemen and that of Russia in the Ukraine. However, Western States are
those most likely to engage in and agitate for military intervention in
other States, for example via activation of a “responsibility to protect.” 168
WEOG States also continue to exercise considerable power over the
developing world through economic interventions initiated by bodies in
which they have the greatest say, the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank. 169 Western developed States also have the better end of
167. Ali A. Mazrui, The New Dynamics of Security: The United Nations and Africa, 13
WORLD POL’Y J. 37, 42 (1996).
168. See Andrew Garwood-Gowers, The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring:
Libya as the Exception, Syria as the Norm? 36 U.N.S.W. L. J. 594, 597-98 (2013) (explaining
the controversy that R2P has generated amongst states); Elizabeth O’Shea, Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) in Libya: Ghosts of the Past Haunting the Future, 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV.
173, 185 (2012) (“The interests of the NATO countries have defined the priorities of
the intervention in Libya.”).
169. See, e.g., Daniela Magalhães Prates, Rise of the Global South and Descent of the North?
Exploration of the Rise of the Global South and Its Impact on International Financial Architecture,
BRETTONWOODS
PROJECT
(Sept.
2015),
https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2016/03/rise-of-the-global-south-anddescent-of-descent-of-the-north/ (discussing the US Congress’ block of the IMF’s
2010 governance reforms, making Brazil, China, India, and Russia among the top 10
IMF shareholders); MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY
AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 24 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining the role of the WTO under
the umbrella of global institutions, alongside the IMF and World Bank); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: Governance and
Accountability, 16 GOVERNANCE 111, 113–16 (2003) (debating whether the IMF
intentionally failed in stabilizing East Asia in order to pursue other objectives); Mark J.
Wolff, Failure of the International Monetary Fund & World Bank to Achieve Integral
Development: A Critical Historical Assessment of Bretton Woods Institutions Policies, Structures &
Governance, 41 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 71, 94-96 (2013) (quoting JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 16 (2003)) (“The Keynesian
orientation of the IMF, which emphasized market failures and the role for government
in job creation, was replaced by the free market mantra of the 1980’ s, as part of a new
“Washington Consensus”- a consensus between the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S.
Treasury about the “right” policies for developing countries-that signaled a radically
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the lopsided global trading obligations devised under the auspices of the
World Trade Organisation, 170 which gives them even more leverage over
the economies of poorer States.
Therefore, the majority of the Council, which reflects the majority
of the UN itself and the majority of the world’s population, is made
up of developing States that are resistant to strong condemnatory
resolutions and interference in States on human rights grounds.
Those who are most in favor of strong resolutions and actions are the
developed high-income States. It does not help the atmospherics
within the Council that the most interventionist members are the
former colonizers and sites of major economic and military power, 171
whereas those most suspicious of intervention are generally the
former colonies and the most economically vulnerable.
The sovereignty issue is further muddied by its occasional use by
developed States when the spotlight is turned on their own human rights
records. For example, Secretary Pompeo stated, with regard to the US
withdrawal from the Council:
. . . when organizations undermine our national interests and our allies, we
will not be complicit. When they seek to infringe on our national sovereignty,
we will not be silent. The United States—which leads the world in
humanitarian assistance, and whose service members have sacrificed life and
limb to free millions from oppression and tyranny—will not take lectures
from hypocritical bodies and institution as Americans selflessly give their
blood and treasure to help the defenseless. 172

Indeed, the US statement is steeped in irony, as it fiercely guards its
own sovereignty whilst referring to its own incursions into the
sovereignty of other States.
At its heart, there is a long-term rift between the Global North (or
different approach to economic development and stabilization.”).
170. PASCAL LAMY, THE GENEVA CONSENSUS: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR ALL 3
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
171. The long period of Western economic dominance may be starting to wane with
the rise of China, Brazil, India, and Russia, as well as the meandering economies of
Europe and the US. See generally Dan Steinbock, The Global Economic Balance of Power is
Shifting,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(Sept.
20,
2017),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/09/the-global-economic-balance-of-poweris-shifting (predicting that by the early 2030s, the BRICs’ combined economic power
will surpass that of the major advanced nations).
172. Pompeo & Haley, supra note 131.
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“Western States”) and the Global South that continues to permeate the
UN, even if positions are probably more nuanced than in the past. The
Human Rights Council, and before it the Commission, is a site where
States continue to highlight or reflect broader historical, economic and
developmental grievances and injustices. These concerns are not
irrelevant to human rights, but they can distort the Council’s intended
focus on human rights concerns.

E. A STUDY IN DYSFUNCTION: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL AND
ISRAEL
Although politicization and selectivity are widespread at the
Council, the focus on Israel’s actions in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory is the most extreme and enduring example of these
phenomena. While an outlier, the treatment of Israel provides an
illustration of some of the underlying dynamics which threaten the
functioning of the Council generally, in particular the North/South
divide, the historical legacy of the struggle against oppression and
colonialism, and reflexive bloc behavior.
Bias against Israel was widely acknowledged as a feature of the
Commission 173 and continues in the Council. Israel is the only country
which is the subject of its own standing agenda item. 174 It has been
the subject of more special sessions than any other State. 175 Its special
procedure stands in perpetuity until the Occupation is over, and the
mandate-holder can only investigate its actions rather than those of
173. See Roznai & Tzang, supra note 143, at 53-55 (“[T]he HRC’s selective application
of human rights review is discriminatory and it violates the universal nature of human
rights.”); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights at the United Nations 1955–85: The Question of Bias,
32 INT’L STUD. Q. 275, 290-91 (1988) (highlighting the continued condemnation of
Israel for human rights violations beyond that of other occupied nations); Ron Wheeler,
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982–1997: A Study of “Targeted”
Resolutions, 32 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 75, 98 (1999) (observing that states such as Brazil, China,
Greece, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey avoid being targeted by the
Commission despite very public human rights violations; yet, resolutions are
consistently passed condemning Israel); Henning Boekle, Western States, the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, and the ‘1235 Procedure’: The ‘Question of Bias’ Revisited, 13
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 367, 382-83 (1995) (recognizing the US’s continued opposition to
HRC criticisms of Israel).
174. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 55 (“Human rights violations and implications
of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and other occupied Arab territories”).
175. See Special Sessions, supra note 63 (as of writing, the Occupied Territories have
been the subject of eight special sessions).

2019]

THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

113

the Palestinians. The many (many) resolutions against Israel are
characterized by extraordinarily strong condemnatory language, while
abusive actions by the Palestinian authorities and Hamas are largely
ignored.
The Israel bias is the main grievance of some of the Council’s
strongest critics. When announcing the US’ withdrawal from the Council,
Secretary of State Pompeo described its bias against Israel as
“unconscionable,”
and
Ambassador
Haley
described
its
“disproportionate focus and unending hostility towards Israel” as “clear
proof that the Council is motivated by political bias, not by human
rights.” 176
Why is the Council biased against Israel? Certainly, Israel commits
serious human rights abuses which are worthy of Council attention and
condemnation. Settlements, 177 forced evictions of Palestinians, 178 war
crimes, 179 the Gaza blockade, 180 targeted and other killings by the Israel
Defense Forces, 181 and, most fundamentally, ongoing occupation of over
176. Pompeo & Haley, supra note 131.
177. Rep. of the Secretary-General, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan, ¶¶ 1, 5, U.N.
Doc A/HRC/28/44 (Mar. 9, 2015); U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the independent
international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli
settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian
people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, ¶¶
100-11, U.N. Doc A/HRC/22/63 (Feb. 7, 2013); The humanitarian impact on Palestinians
of Israeli settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank, U.N. OFF. FOR THE
COORDINATION
HUMANITARIAN
AFF.
(July
30,
2007),
https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-impact-palestinians-israelisettlements-and-other-infrastructure-west-bank (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
178. See, e.g., icahduk, Demolition and Displacement Report - May 2019, ISRAELI COMM.
AGAINST
HOUSE
DEMOLITIONS:
NEWS
(June
3,
2019),
https://icahd.org/2019/06/03/demolition-and-displacement-report-may-2019/
(creating a timeline of Israel’s demolitions and occupations in Palestinian Territory);
Yael Stone, Fake Justice: The Responsibility Israel’s High Court Justices Bear for the Demolition of
Palestinian Homes and the Dispossession of Palestinians 7, B’TSELEM (Feb. 2019),
https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/publications/201902_fake_justice_eng.
pdf (explaining Israel retained full control over security matter as well as land-related
civil affairs over 60% of the West Bank).
179. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied
Arab Territories, Rep. of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict, at 404-08, U.N. Doc A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) (linking Israel’s policies
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory with its military operations in Gaza).
180. Id. at 404-08.
181. Sarit Michaeli, Crowd Control: Israel’s Use of Crowd Control Weapons in the West Bank,
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fifty years, 182 rightly generate condemnation. Nevertheless, that does
not explain the Council’s disproportionate attention to this one
country, given the many extreme human rights abuses perpetrated by
other States which receive far less scrutiny.
Israel has many enemies amongst UN States. Many OIC members
have never accepted Israel’s right to exist, believing that it was
established illegitimately on Arab (Palestinian) land. Indeed, the OIC
was set up in 1969 “to unite Muslim countries” after the 1967 war in
which Israel seized the now-occupied territories, 183 so opposition to
Israel has been an article of faith since its inception. These States
therefore bring as much diplomatic pressure to bear as is possible on
Israel and are often able to mobilize significant bloc support in aid of
that goal.
The racial element, whereby the Jewish State of Israel illegally
occupies lands populated by Arabs in the Occupied Territories,
attracts the ire of developing States, which have historical grievances
regarding racial oppression. 184 Yet other instances of racial oppression
fail to attract the same passion, such as that of the Tibetans, the
Kurds, the West Papuans, the Tamils or the Chechens.
One difference is that Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories
is not recognized as legitimate by any other State besides Israel, unlike
for example China’s sovereignty over Tibet or Indonesia’s sovereignty
over West Papua. 185 Indeed, a large number of States have diplomatically
recognized the Occupied Territories as the State of Palestine, and the
UN General Assembly voted 2012 to accord Palestine non-member
B’TSELEM
29-31,
49
(Jan.
2013),
https://www.btselem.org/download/201212_crowd_control_eng.pdf.
182. Israel denies that it continues to occupy Gaza since it withdrew its forces
from the territory in 2005. However, it continues to maintain a blockade and
exercise control over most of Gaza’s land and sea borders, and airspace. See, e.g.,
Anna Aronheim, Half of Israelis in Favor of Removing the Blockade on Gaza: Study,
JERUSALEM
POST
(June
13,
2019),
https://www.jpost.com/printarticle.aspx?id=592266 (finding “80% of Israelis think
that the economic situation in Gaza is “difficult to severe,” while another 61% agree
that the difficult economic situation in Gaza is directly related to the violent conflict
between Hamas and Israel”).
183. FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 124.
184. FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 131-32.
185. This statement is purely concerned with the fact that most States recognize such
sovereignty. It is not to say that that position is unassailable.
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observer State status. 186 Hence, developing States do not have to
compromise their traditional concerns for sovereignty in order to
criticize Israel’s actions in the Occupied Territories.
The fact of occupation also allows States to feel safe in attacking
Israel without being hypocritical. For example, members of the
African Group have defended their support for the special procedure
on the Occupied Territories (in the face of in-principle rejection of
country-specific mandates) by arguing that they do not consider it to
be a country-specific mandate at all, but a thematic issue on
occupation. 187 While human rights abuses are regrettably common,
the status of “an occupier” is rare. Indeed, Israel is sometimes seen
as a “remnant of colonialism.” 188 This also explains why the focus is
on Israel’s actions in the Occupied Territories, rather than its actions
in Israel “proper.” However, Israel is not the only occupier. Morocco
has long illegally occupied the Western Sahara yet there is comparable
global silence on that situation. 189
Israel is also seen as a surrogate for the West, particularly the US.
Given that Israel is almost always defended within the UN by the
US, 190 and is often defended by much of WEOG, “Israel- bashing”
has become part of a greater North/South divide in the UN. AntiAmerican States such as Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador and Russia see
Israel as “the US foothold in the Middle East” and use the issue to
“attack US hegemony and interference.” 191 Furthermore, bias against
Israel can be matched in the Council by biased displays of unwavering
support from States such as the US and Australia.
Some defenders of Israel, such as the NGOs UN Watch and Human
186. G.A. Res. 67/19, ¶ 2 (Dec. 4, 2012).
187. Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the
Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 9 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1,
33 (2009).
188. FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 131.
189. Kristen Chick, In Remote Western Sahara, Prized Phosphate Drives Controversial
Investments,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Jan.
24,
2013),
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2013/0124/In-remote-Western-Saharaprized-phosphate-drives-controversial-investments; U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Morocco, ¶ 88, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/21/3 (July 6, 2012); U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the
Situation Concerning Western Sahara, ¶ 88, U.N. Doc. S/2013/220 (Apr. 8, 2013).
190. FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 164.
191. FREEDMAN, supra note 142, at 131.
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Rights Voices, argue vehemently that anti-Semitism is at the heart of the
Council’s bias. 192 However, Israel’s human rights critics globally
encompass a vast range of people, ranging from anti-Semites to people
of good will. The equation of anti-Israel with anti-Semitism is oversimplistic. As noted above, other significant reasons exist for the
Council’s condemnation, including the existence of serious human rights
abuses.
Regardless of its causes, the Council’s bias against Israel is
counterproductive. It provides Israel with a ready-made argument to
reject criticism, even when it is legitimate, thus providing cover for
human rights abuses. Indeed, claims of bias (within and outside the
UN) have become a dominant part of the Middle East narrative,
detracting from a focus on the actions of the protagonists.
Furthermore, the Council has done little to discourage wrongful
actions by the Palestinian authorities against Israel such as the rocket
attacks from Gaza, nor has it addressed the very real abuses
perpetrated by those authorities against their own people. Nor, for
that matter, does the UN focus on the rights of Israelis within Israel.
Bias has facilitated Israel’s progressive disillusionment with and
disengagement from the UN, culminating in its minimal cooperation
with the UPR, and has been a key pretext for the US walkout. It opens
the Council up to charges of hypocrisy and selectivity and reduces its
credibility. None of these outcomes are useful for those who sincerely
wish for improvements in human rights for all in Israel and the
Occupied Territories, or for the proper functioning of the Council. If
the Council is to survive and thrive, redirecting some of the time and
attention placed on Israel towards other grave human rights situations
would be a good start.

192. Anne Bayefsky, Trump’s Wise to Quit the UN Human Rights Council – It’s an
Oxymoron Not Worthy of our Respect or Support, FOX NEWS (June 19, 2018),
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/trumps-wise-to-quit-the-un-human-rightscouncil-its-an-oxymoron-not-worthy-of-our-respect-or-support; Anne Bayefsky,
Depravity at the U.N. Human Rights Council, JERUSALEM POST (July 24, 2014),
https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Depravity-at-the-UNHuman-Rights-Council-368834.
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IV. FIXING THE COUNCIL
In this part, we examine the ways in which the Council might
realistically improve in fulfilling its role in promoting and protecting
human rights across the globe. There are limits to the ability of this
political body to become less political—its character as an
intergovernmental body would have to change outright in order for
that to happen. However, there are strategies or ways in which it can
do a much better job. These strategies are exemplified in the
following case study, which tracks the Council’s engagement with
sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) rights.

A. CASE STUDY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
RIGHTS AT THE COUNCIL
Recent decades have seen tremendous advances in the recognition of
rights relating to SOGI in many parts of the world, from decriminalization of sexual relations between people of the same sex to the
recognition in many nations of marriage equality. Progress on SOGI has
similarly been made at the Council. 193
That progress has, however, been far from linear, and has taken
place in the face of significant hostility from some States. In many
ways, the evolution of SOGI issues at the Council reflects several of
the difficulties and tensions which dominate the institution generally,
in particular the North/South divide and claims of moral imperialism,
and resistance from the African and OIC groups (and the power of
their voting blocs). Despite these obstacles, significant progress has
been made on SOGI by the Council in the last decade.
1. Key SOGI milestones at the HRC
The first draft resolution on sexual orientation at the Council was
tabled by Brazil in 2003. Unfortunately, Brazil was woefully unprepared
to champion the resolution. It failed to anticipate the hostile reception
from other States, and from domestic actors such as the Catholic Church.
It neglected to communicate effectively with civil society, so relevant

193. Dodo Karsay, How Far Has SOGII Advocacy Come at the U.N. and Where is It
Heading?,
ARC
INT’L
(2014),
https://arc-international.net/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/How-far-has-SOGII-for-web.pdf.
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organizations were unprepared for the draft resolution. 194 In 2004,
Brazil opted not to resubmit the draft resolution and in 2005, it
lapsed. This episode shows how not to move forward in the Council
on a contentious issue.
A significant step backwards took place in 2010. In November of that
year, the UN General Assembly voted by 79 votes to 70 (with 17
abstentions and 26 absentees) to remove an explicit condemnation of
killings on the basis of sexual orientation from a resolution on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. 195 The disgraceful
implication from this action was that sexual orientation was not an
arbitrary ground upon which to execute people. Given that very low
point, the progress on SOGI rights since November 2010 has been
extraordinary.
In December 2010, the UNGA swiftly reversed its November
decision by 93 to 55 with 27 abstentions. 196 The condemnation of
killings based on a person’s sexuality was restored after extensive
lobbying by the US. 197 Importantly, local civil society had successfully
lobbied States such as South Africa, Colombia and Cuba to change
their vote. 198 As further explored below, this was an important
example of States being held to account at home for their voting
behavior in the UN. Indeed, in November 2012, 108 States voted for
the resolution, and for the first time added a reference to “gender

194. Eduard Jordaan, The Challenges of Adopting Sexual Orientation Resolutions at the UN
Human Rights Council, 8 J. HUM. RTS. PRACT. 298, 301 (2016).
195. U.N. General Assembly, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights
Questions, Including Alternative approaches for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Rep. of the Third Comm., ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. A/65/456/Add.
2 (Part II) (Dec. 8, 2010); Sarah Joseph, The U.N., Executions, and LGBT Rights, CASTAN
CTR. HUM. RTS. L. (Nov. 23, 2010), https://castancentre.com/2010/11/23/the-unexecutions-and-glbt-rights/.
196. U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 71st plen. mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc A/65/PV.71 (Dec.
21, 2010).
197. Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Restores Gay Reference to Violence Measure, REUTERS
(Dec.
21,
2010),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-gaysidUSTRE6BK6UW20101222.
198. Anita Snow, Gay Rights Row Breaks Out Over Amended U.N. Resolution, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/gayrights-row-un-resolution; Noelle Stout, The Rise of Gay Tolerance in Cuba: The Case of the
U.N. Vote, NACLA (Aug. 16, 2011), https://nacla.org/article/rise-gay-tolerance-cubacase-un-vote.
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identity” as a prohibited ground of execution. 199 65 States abstained
and only one State, Iran, voted against the resolution.
A similar struggle over SOGI rights re-emerged in the Council. In
mid-2010, several States objected to the focus of the report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, on the health
consequences of the criminalization of same sex relations for
HIV/AIDS transmission. 200 Bangladesh accused Grover of inventing a
new marginalized group, while South Africa disapproved of the focus on
LGBTI issues. 201
Despite its opposition to Grover’s report, South Africa emerged as a
new leader on SOGI rights a year later. Working closely with Brazil and
Norway, and with considerable input from civil society, South Africa
worked on a draft resolution which was ultimately adopted by the
Council at its seventeenth session in mid-2011. 202
That document, Resolution 17/19, was relatively weak, expressing
“grave concern” over acts of violence and discrimination “in all regions”
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. It mandated a
report on SOGI-related violence by the UN High Commissioner of
Human Rights, and a subsequent panel discussion. Even these modest
steps represented a tremendous advance for SOGI rights, and the
document is still considered by many SOGI activists to be the most
significant single achievement for LGBTI people at the UN. 203
Almost all of the OIC and the Africa group voted against
resolution 17/19, except for South Africa and Mauritius (voting in
favor), and Zambia and Burkina Faso (abstaining). This resistance,
largely from its own bloc, helps to explain why South Africa’s
leadership did not endure. 204 Throughout 2012 and 2013, tensions
199. G.A. Res. 67/168, ¶ 6 (Mar. 15, 2013).
200. Anand Grover (Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment
of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health), ¶¶ 4, 11, 13, 15,
U.N. Doc A/HRC/14/20 (Apr. 27, 2010).
201. Human Rights Council: Consensus Re-Established on Freedom of Religion and Belief, but
Divisive Appointments to Special Procedures Taint 14th Session, HUM. RTS. MONITOR Q. 12–
14 (Apr. 2010).
202. H.R.C. Res. 17/19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/19 (June 17, 2011).
203. Dodo Karsay, How Far Has SOGII Advocacy Come at the U.N. and Where is It
Heading?,
ARC
INT’L
(2014),
https://arc-international.net/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/How-far-has-SOGII-for-web.pdf.
204. Eduard Jordaan, Foreign Policy Without the Policy? South Africa and Activism on Sexual
Orientation at the United Nations, 24 S. AFR. J. INT’L AFF. 79, 91 (2017) [hereinafter
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arose between South Africa and some Western and Latin American
states over the pace of developments. South Africa had proposed a
series of regional workshops to be held in early 2013, to be followed
by a new resolution at the June 2013 Council session. However, South
Africa refused to proceed until the African workshop had been
held—an event which was repeatedly delayed. South Africa was
seeking election to the Council in November 2013 and was worried
that its prospects would be damaged by pushing the SOGI cause.
At the March 2014 session, South Africa finally conceded that it would
no longer lead on the SOGI issue. 205 A concerted effort from civil society
eventually succeeded in convincing Uruguay and Colombia to lead,
joined later by Chile and Brazil. These states—known as the LAC 4—
led the Council to adopt its second SOGI resolution in 2014. 206 While
the draft resolution met with considerable resistance, particularly from
members of the OIC and the African Group, 207 it was adopted by an
absolute majority of the Council, with support from States from all
regions, and a substantial increase in the margin of success compared to
2011. 208
From 2014, the core leadership group expanded to include Argentina,
Mexico and Costa Rica. The (renamed) LAC 7 took the lead in proposing
a draft resolution in 2016, which included the establishment of a
dedicated special procedure on SOGI. The resolution eventually passed
with 23 votes for, 18 against, and 6 abstentions. 209 In September 2016,
Mr. Vitit Muntarbhorn was appointed the first UN Independent Expert
on violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity. In late 2016, the African group proposed amendments in the
General Assembly which would have deferred action on the
establishment of the mandate and denied it budgetary resources. These

Jordaan, Foreign Policy Without the Policy?].
205. Jordaan, Foreign Policy Without the Policy?, supra note 204, at 83.
206. H.R.C. Res. 27/32, A/HRC/RES/27/32 (Sept. 24, 2014).
207. John Fisher, The Power of a Positive Vision: How the Human Rights Council Came to
Adopt a Majority Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, INT’L
SERV. HUM. RTS. (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.ishr.ch/news/power-positive-visionhow-human-rights-council-came-adopt-majority-resolution-human-rights-0 (adding
that these were not the only states to express opposition. Russia, for example, was also
vocal in resisting the resolution).
208. Fisher, supra note 207.
209. H.R.C. Res. 32/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/2 (June 30, 2016).
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proposed amendments were defeated. 210 Muntarbhorn duly commenced
his mandate, though he stepped down in 2017 due to ill health and was
replaced by Victor Madrigal-Borloz. In 2019, the mandate was extended
for a further three years with an increased majority in its favour. 211
2. Factors driving SOGI progress
There are several factors which, at key moments, facilitated HRC
progress on SOGI initiatives. The first—and most important—was
leadership from the Global South. States advocating anti-SOGI positions
have often sought to discredit SOGI rights as a Western construct
outside the accepted cannon of human rights law, and to characterize
pro-SOGI initiatives as Western imperialism. 212 In order to dismantle this
myth and make progress on SOGI issues, leadership had to come from
the Global South.
While South Africa’s commitment was enough to bring about the
2011 resolution, it could not be sustained in the face of pressure from
the African Group. 213 The comparative success and endurance of the
LAC core groups reveals that sharing the leadership burden across a core
group can facilitate sustainable and successful leadership on controversial
issues. 214
A second, related, factor is the quality of the leadership. Brazil’s
diplomacy in 2003 was roundly criticized, with Jordaan describing it
as “bumbling.” 215 Conversely, the diplomatic efforts of the LAC
group have been widely praised as sophisticated, well-planned, and
inclusive. Fisher describes the 2014 resolution process as “marked by
dedicated outreach, tenacity and conviction.” 216 This continued in the
lead-up to the 2016 resolution. According to ARC International:
210. Rosa Freedman, U.N. Fight Over LGBT Protection Threatens to Undermine the
Human
Rights
System,
THE
CONVERSATION
(Nov.
4,
2016),
http://theconversation.com/un-fight-over-lgbt-protection-threatens-to-underminethe-human-rights-system-68215.
211. See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/L.10/Rev.1 (July 10, 2019) (adopting the resolution
with 27 in favour, 12 against, and 7 abstentions).
212. M. Joel Voss, Contesting Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity at the U.N. Human
Rights Council, 19 HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 20 (2018).
213. See generally Jordaan, Foreign Policy Without the Policy?, supra note 204 (providing a
detailed analysis of South Africa’s policy positions on SOGI rights at the UN).
214. Jordaan, Foreign Policy Without the Policy?, supra note 204, at 301.
215. Id.
216. Fisher, supra note 207.
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There was open and close consultation with civil society and a willingness
to take suggestions on board as well as an effort to get on board the
maximum number of states. It is entirely possible that the Asian and
African countries which either voted for or abstained on the resolution,
did so because the leadership on the SOGI resolution 2016 came from the
global south. 217

Another factor in the success of SOGI resolutions was the appropriate
support of Western states. For example, Norway played an influential
role in the drafting and adoption of South Africa’s 2011 resolution.
Similarly, the EU and US lent considerable backing and resources to the
LAC groups, including their diplomatic networks. 218
Engagement by civil society has also been crucial. Lobbying of
governments by their domestic civil societies, as well as advocacy by
human rights and LGBTI organizations at the HRC, have all influenced
the trajectory of SOGI issues. 219 In 2003, Brazil neglected to liaise with
civil society, so NGOs were caught unawares by the tabling of the
resolution. Without time to coordinate, travel and lobby, they were
unable to bring their influence to bear. In contrast, the LAC core group
has worked closely with civil society at the Council, and directly with
groups in their own countries. 220 Collaboration with NGOs, through side
panels and group statements, shaped the debate. 221
Finally, dedicated promotion of SOGI rights by UN leaders, in
particular (now former) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and (now
former) UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, played
an important role in progress on these issues. Their outspokenness
217. Appointing an Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: An
Analysis of Process, Results and Implications, ARC INT’L 36 (2016) [hereinafter Appointing an
Independent
Expert
I],
http://arc-international.net/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/HRC32-final-report-EN.pdf.
218. Jordaan, Foreign Policy Without the Policy?, supra note 204, at 304.
219. Dodo Karsay, How Far Has SOGII Advocacy Come at the U.N. and Where is It
Heading?,
ARC
INT’L
(2014),
https://arc-international.net/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/How-far-has-SOGII-for-web.pdf.
220. Appointing an Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: An
Analysis of Process, Results and Implications, ARC INT’L 15 (2016), http://arcinternational.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/HRC32-final-report-EN.pdf.
221. John Fisher, The Power of a Positive Vision: How the Human Rights Council Came to
Adopt a Majority Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, INT’L
SERV. HUM. RTS. (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.ishr.ch/news/power-positive-visionhow-human-rights-council-came-adopt-majority-resolution-human-rights-0.
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brought clarity to SOGI norms and encouraged civil society activism. 222
This case study provides an insight into how some of the Council’s
political constraints might be overcome, and progress made on
contentious topics. The SOGI experience suggests that leadership
from the Global South is critical, and that it can be encouraged and
buttressed through the building of core leadership groups, appropriate
background support from Western countries as well as significant figures
like the UN Secretary General and coordinated civil society action.

B. SALVAGING THE COUNCIL
The preceding analysis of the functioning of the Council, and the
SOGI case study, suggest a way forward for the Council.
1. More principles, less politics
In an intergovernmental body such as the Council, some degree of
politicization is inevitable. The key to a better Human Rights Council
is for States to be driven more by principle than by politics. States can
and should take measures to mitigate the worst effects of
politicization. As Cox observes:
[T]he UN will not be able to have a truly powerful human rights body until
a sufficient number of its member states desire it—an outcome unlikely to
happen until enough states have improved their human rights records to
the point where they are no longer threatened by a powerful HRC. 223

There will probably always be States that have little intention of
observing human rights at home and will therefore seek to undermine
the very idea of human rights if they should unfortunately be elected
to the Council. The analysis of actual Council membership above
indicates that such States are, however, unlikely to ever constitute a
number close to a majority. A majority of States do, at least on
occasion, seek to respect human rights at home.
Part of the answer, therefore, lies in States aligning their Council
222. Elizabeth Baisley, Reaching the Tipping Point?: Emerging International Human Rights
Norms Pertaining to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identify, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 134, 155-61
(2016); Karsay, supra note 219, at 9-10.
223. Eric Cox, State Interests and the Creation and Functioning of the United Nations Human
Rights Council Engagement and Escape: International Legal Institutions and Public Political
Contestation, 6 INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 87, 119 (2010).
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positions with their own professed human rights values. A large
number of States embrace human rights standards in their domestic
laws but act inconsistently with these values at the Council. For
example, South Africa and India, whose constitutions are lauded for
their protection and promotion of human rights, nonetheless
occasionally embrace roles as “spoilers” at the Council. These States
must be held accountable—by other member States and their own
domestic civil societies—for acting contrary to their constitutional
values on the world stage.
An example of such activism arose with regard to the 2010 General
Assembly resolution where the reference to “sexual orientation” was
removed from the resolution on arbitrary killings, but swiftly restored
six weeks later. While US leadership on the second resolution was
crucial, local NGOs rallied to showcase the disgraceful homophobic
votes of their own governments. This activism, for example, helped to
reverse the votes of Colombia and South Africa, and changed Cuba’s
vote to an abstention. While lobbying in 2010 failed to change Thailand’s
original abstention, 224 that State voted in favor of the groundbreaking
SOGI resolution in the Council in 2011.
2. Leadership from the Global South
The leadership of the LAC States, and to an extent South Africa, on
SOGI issues illustrates the potential for advancing human rights
standards and protection with leadership from the Global South. Indeed,
with the US withdrawing from the Council, the need for alternative
leadership is even greater. Developing States must take ownership of
human rights values on the world stage, rather than treat them as a postcolonial football within the broader North/South divide. The strategy of
portraying human rights as a Western concept, and therefore sometimes
as a form of neo-colonialism, cedes the ground of leadership to Western
States. It does not do justice to the progress amongst many developing
States on human rights, nor does it acknowledge the grave human rights
abuses by Western States which undercut the presumption of “Western
values.”
Some developing States already lead on certain “pet” issues. For
224. Thailand’s Shameful Rejection of Human Rights, THE NATION (Mar. 8, 2011),
https://www.asiaone.com/print/News/Latest+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20110308
-267021.html.
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example, while India is generally known for its reticent (and at times
hostile) engagement with the Council, it has taken a proactive lead on
access to medicine 225 and human rights and transnational
corporations. 226 It is critical that this sort of leadership extends
beyond discreet thematic issues to other issues, including countryspecific situations.
There are signs that a number of developing States are willing to take
on a leadership mantle. LAC leadership on SOGI rights is a prime
example. Some States from the Global South have also demonstrated a
new willingness to adopt condemnatory positions on delinquent States.
Brazil has acknowledged that “cooperation won’t be able to solve all
human rights problems” and that “monitoring activities” and
“condemnations” are sometimes necessary. 227 The principled
engagement of countries like Chile, Mexico, Uruguay or Costa Rica in
the Latin American Group, and of Botswana, Sierra Leone or Ghana in
the African Group, has been pivotal to the ability of the Council to act
on a number of country situations. 228
3. Rethinking the roles of Western States
WEOG States must rethink the way in which they engage at the
Council. Western States have been most likely to lead on countryspecific situations. However, their ability to build cross- regional
support for these initiatives is damaged by their own selectivity and
politicization. While the US and others may rightly point to the
disproportionate focus on Israel as an example of Council selectivity,
their unprincipled shielding of Israel and other allies such as Saudi
Arabia is also damning, as are instances of their reflexive rejection of
criticism of their own records. Western States seeking to play a
leadership role at the Council must themselves be more principled in
order to enhance their own credibility and that of the Council.
Western States should also consider how they can best facilitate
Southern counterparts to provide principled leadership. A number of
225. H.R.C. Res. 12/24, A/HRC/RES/12/24 (June 17, 2011).
226. H.R.C. Res. 17/4, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (June 27, 2014).
227. Eduard Jordaan, Rising Powers and Human Rights: The India-Brazil-South Africa
Dialogue Forum at the UN Human Rights Council, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 463, 465–66 (2015).
228. Philippe Dam, Ten Lessons from 30 Sessions: Improving the Human Rights Council,
INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. (May 26, 2016), http://www.ishr.ch/news/ten-lessons-30sessions-improving-human-rights-council.
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Western states, including the US and Norway, played “backroom” roles
which were critical to the success of the SOGI resolutions. By making
available their diplomatic networks and Geneva-based resources,
Western States can enhance the effectiveness of leadership from the
Global South.
True support for Southern leadership will require Western States to
surrender some control and show humility. It is not foreseeable that
WEOG will somehow gain control of the Council’s agenda. If States
from the Global South are to take real ownership of human rights,
human rights will change and may reflect different priorities. Leadership
already comes from the South, just not on the issues of importance to
Western States. As noted, India has led on access to medicine. Ecuador
is currently leading efforts in the UN Open-Ended Inter-Governmental
Working Group to develop “an international legally binding instrument
on Transnational Corporations and other business enterprises with
respect to human rights” pursuant to resolution 26/9, a move resisted by
Western States. 229
In 2016, the Council passed Resolution 33/14, which established the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Development. 230 A
broad range of States from the Global South—on a full spectrum from
‘good’ to ‘appalling’ human rights actors—voted in favor of the
resolution. The UK and France voted against, with the rest of the EU,
Eastern Europe, and South Korea abstaining. Interestingly, the EU
explained its position by arguing that on the matter of the right to
development “diverging views remained and a common position had not
been reached so far.” The UK stated that although it supported the right
to development, it believed that the Human Rights Council agenda was
already overloaded and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur would
detract from more pressing items. 231 These objections echo those which
were advanced by some States from the Global South in resisting the
SOGI mandate. 232
It is important to distinguish between politicized leadership—in which
229. See H.R.C. Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014).
230. H.R.C. Res. 33/14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/33/14, ¶¶ 14-18 (Oct. 5, 2016).
231. Adriano José Timossi, Special Rapporteur to Monitor the Right to Development,
INDEPTH
NEWS
(Sept.
30
2016),
https://archive-2016-2017indepthnews.net/index.php/global-governance/un-insider/702-special-rapporteur-tomonitor-the-right-to-development.
232. Appointing an Independent Expert I, supra note 217, at 50-51, 65.
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an issue is being assertively promoted in order to cynically limit the
advancement or protection of human rights, or to undermine the
functioning of the Council—and principled leadership with which one
may not agree. While the former must be condemned, the latter must be
acknowledged and accepted as evidence of the ‘ownership’ of human
rights by the full range of States, and of the proper functioning of the
Council.
4. Crossing Bloc Divides
Cross-regional cooperation, and the building of cross-regional
groups, can strengthen principled engagement. 233 It signals broad
consensus, and mitigates the effect of regional and political blocs and
the North/South divide. Close cooperation by States can also enable
the pooling of resources and can help ‘spread’ or share the burden of
any backlash. Cross-regional cooperation of this kind depends on
States identifying a common human rights concern, then taking active
steps to develop the trust necessary to overcome the instinct towards
politicization. 234
An example of the successful use of such a strategy arose over the
matter of ‘defamation of religions.’ From 2001 in the Commission to
2010 in the Council, the OIC had pushed, largely successfully, resolutions
on defamation of religions, 235 against the objections of WEOG. The
notion of combating defamation of religions effectively calls upon States
to outlaw blasphemy and practices which might cause offence to others
on the basis of the latter’s religion. The concept of “defamation of
religions” extends beyond clear human rights issues such as religious
vilification or discrimination on the basis of religion: it verges towards
giving religions human rights rather than human beings who adhere to
religious beliefs. Such a concept poses unacceptable limitations on
freedom of expression 236 and the free exercise of some religious
233. Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the
Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,
3 (2009).
234. Yvonne Terlingen, The Human Rights Council: A New Era in U.N. Human Rights
Work?, 21 ETHICS INT’L AFF. 167, 178 (2007); Dam, supra note 228.
235. H.R.C. Res. 13/16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/13/16, ¶ 3 (Apr. 15, 2010);
H.R.C. Res. 7/19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/19, ¶¶ 7-9 (Mar. 27, 2008).
236. Right to Freedom of Expression Vital as Algeria Embarks on Reforms – UN Expert,
U.N. NEWS (Apr. 19, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/04/372722-rightfreedom-expression-vital-algeria-embarks-reforms-un-expert.
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beliefs. 237
In 2011 the defamation resolution was withdrawn. It was effectively
replaced by a resolution on the need to combat religious intolerance and
discrimination, matters well within the bounds of human rights law. 238
That resolution, which had originally been drafted by the US and Egypt
and adopted in 2009, was introduced by Pakistan from the OIC and
passed by consensus. 239 Disputes between the IOC and WEOG on this
issue have not disappeared. Nevertheless, the US/Egypt cooperation
across that divide was crucial in resolving, at least temporarily, a
seemingly intractable Council conflict in favor of a much more human
rights friendly approach.
5. Bolstering the participation of NGOS
Many NGOs wishing to participate in Council activities face
significant barriers. Difficulties securing accreditation and visas to travel,
threats and reprisals, inadequate funding and resources, limited language
skills, lack of familiarity with UN systems and membership of the
Geneva “club,” and gatekeeping behavior by other NGOs, can prevent
an organization from participating, or dilute their impact at the
Council. 240 Some of these barriers have been recognized by the UN: the
High Commissioner has called for reform of ECOSOC’s NGO
Committee. 241 Yet, the situation in practice remains little changed. 242
237. Saad Sayeed, Pakistan’s Long-persecuted Ahmadi Minority Fear Becoming Election
Scapegoat, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistanelection-ahmadis/pakistans-long-persecuted-ahmadi-minority-fear-becoming-electionscapegoat-idUSKBN1DG04H.
238. H.R.C. Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18, ¶¶ 1-4 (Mar. 24, 2011).
239. SEJAL PARMAR, UPROOTING ‘DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS’ AND PLANTING A
NEW APPROACH TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AT THE UNITED NATIONS 398
(Tarlach McGonagle & Yvonne Donders eds., 2015).
240. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of Marina Kiai (Special Rapporteur) on Rights to Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, ¶¶ 72-85, U.N. Doc. A/69/365 (Sept. 1, 2014); The
Backlash Against Civil Society Access and Participation at the United Nations, INT’L SERV. HUM.
RTS. 2, 4-5 (2018), https://www.ishr.ch/news/new-report-backlash-against-civilsociety-access-and-participation-united-nations (last visited Jun. 20, 2019).
241. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts.,
Procedures and Practices in Respect of Civil Society Engagement with International
and Regional Organizations, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc A/HRC/38/18 (Apr. 18, 2018).
242. U.N. Secretary-General, Cooperation with the United Nations, its Representatives and
Mechanisms in the Field of Human Rights, ¶¶ 13-18, U.N. Doc A/HRC/36/31 (Mar. 29,
2018); McEvoy et al., Ending Reprisals Against Those Who Cooperate with the United Nations
in the Field of Human Rights: Submission to the UN Secretary-General on Recent Developments,
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Nevertheless, some factors which might increase NGO impact lie
(to a greater extent) within the control of civil society itself. It is clear
from the example of SOGI rights that NGOs can be instrumental in
advancing principled action at the Council. Efforts to build the
capacity of domestic organizations to engage with the Council, and
better communication and cooperation between NGOs in order to build
consensus and align advocacy strategies, enhances effectiveness. 243 It is
important that NGOs strategically seek out “unusual suspects” for
building alliances on particular issues, including other NGOs and
developing States. NGOs can support leadership from the Global South
by contributing their lobbying efforts and expertise to the cause.
Coordinated action by coalitions of NGOs can also bring pressure
to bear on target States both at home and in Geneva, contributing to
a better alignment of the State’s behavior at the Council with its
domestic human rights commitments. It is important that NGOs
hold States to account for their behavior on the Council. As seen in
the example of the swift reversal of the 2010 UNGA Resolution,
States can be lobbied to ensure that their votes reflect their professed
human rights values at home. A greater alignment between those
values and a State’s Council performance can be enough to turn
regressive Council majorities into progressive Council majorities.

V. CONCLUSION
The year of 2006 was not an ideal time in which to transform the
Commission into the Council and open up the opportunity to revise
the previous UN human rights acquis. 244 International tensions ran
high, and the human rights record of the evangelizing West smacked
of extreme hypocrisy. Rendition, torture, arbitrary detention, and
other human rights violations characterized much of the West’s
participation in “the War on Terror,” The ongoing war in Iraq, which
Cases and Recommendations, INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. 7 (May 2017),
https://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/documents/reprisals_submission_may_2017
_final_updated.pdf.
243. Dodo Karsay, How Far Has SOGII Advocacy Come at the U.N. and Where is It
Heading?,
ARC
INT’L
(2014),
https://arc-international.net/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/How-far-has-SOGII-for-web.pdf.;
HILARY
CHARLESWORTH & EMMA LARKING, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC
REVIEW 126 (2014).
244. Schrijver, supra note 1, at 817.
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persisted after an illegal invasion in 2003, drove particular enmity
against the US and the UK. The confrontational US attitude within
the UN from its UN Ambassador, John Bolton, meant that that
country played no meaningful role in the birth of the Council. Given
all of these difficulties at its inception, the Council may have turned
out as well as could have been hoped for.
Fast-forwarding to 2019, we find ourselves at a similar juncture.
Current discourse gives the distinct impression that human rights – its
norms, institutions and movement - are in serious crisis. The rise of
populism, 245 the decline in leadership and adherence to human rights
values, 246 and the capacity of human rights to respond to the most
pressing issues of our times, 247 have all been posited as fundamental
threats to the legitimacy and relevance of human rights. The US
withdrawal from the Council epitomizes this phenomenon, with its
hubristic rejection of multilateralism. John Bolton was even back in the
US administration from 2018 to 2019, in the even more powerful role of
National Security adviser.
Between 2006 and 2019, there have been more hopeful years on
the human rights front. While the Arab Spring looks to have soured
245. Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human Rights, 91 HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1
(2017); Kenneth Roth, The Pushback Against the Populist Challenge, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(2017),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/pushback-against-the-populistchallenge; RISING TO THE POPULIST CHALLENGE: A NEW PLAYBOOK FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ACTORS 16 (César Rodriguez-Garavito & Krizna Gomezet eds., 1st ed. 2018).
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(June 29, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/us-turning-its-back-humanrights#.
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in hindsight, the Council adopted a noticeably more progressive
agenda in light of its advent in 2011. 248 Unsurprisingly, the Council
responds to the environment around it. Or, rather, its members do.
And this distinction is crucial—the Council’s faults are essentially
those of its members, rather than of the abstract entity that is the
Council.
In 2007, early on in the Council’s life, the deputy Secretary General of
the UN, Louise Frechet, stated:
To a certain extent we have sought institutional responses, institutional fixes,
through reform to problems that are more fundamental and more political. . . .
The Human Rights Commission was deemed to be ineffective by a lot of
countries. The answer was to transform it into a new institution called the
Human Rights Council. But it’s not performing all that much better than the
Human Rights Commission because the world is composed of countries that
have very different views on human rights. And unless there’s real political
action to really strengthen the solidarity of all the countries that do believe in
human rights across the North-South divide, you shouldn’t be surprised that
you have the exact same results. I think there’s not enough attention paid to
building this political consensus among countries that share the same views,
and too much on the machinery. 249

In the current international environment, which is hostile to
multilateralism, the importance of forums such as the Human Rights
Council, which bring States of all kinds together to discuss and debate,
is greater than ever. States must factor into their decision-making how
excessive politicization and selectivity, which all are guilty of to a greater
and lesser extent, risks sending the Council the way of its predecessor.
States, and also NGOs, must be prepared to undertake the hard
diplomatic and lobbying work of crossing divides, and unearthing likeminds amongst the non-like-minded, in order to achieve multilateral
human rights progress.
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